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supplemental instruction, but did not supply them with a written 
copy of such instruction (R. 85). Defense counsel informed the 
Court that she did not think such an instruction was appropriate, 
but that she needed time to research the issue (R. 83). 
At 5:35 p.m., the judge recalled the jury. He spent 
approximately eight minutes giving the members of the jury a 
supplemental oral instruction (R. 340-342)(Addendum A). He did not 
read a written instruction to the jury; instead, he made a series of 
remarks to the group (R. 85, R. 340-342). The Court informed the 
jury that: 
We are going to talk to you concerning this and 
ask you to go back in the jury room and 
deliberate and reach a decision concerning this 
matter; 
That you have been given sufficient evidence 
to be able to make a decision (R. 340). 
While the Court attempted to temper his statements by 
telling the jurors to make a decision based on independent judgment, 
and not to violate their consciences, he went on to instruct them 
that 
"these are the decisions that are made every day 
in the criminal judicial system. And that is the 
purpose of the jury is to face the issue and make 
the decision. It is not the purpose of the jury 
to avoid making the hard decision" (R. 340). 
The judge addressed the foreman, informing him that if the 
jury had a question as to procedure or needed clarification of a 
point of law, the Court would entertain a question (R. 341). The 
foreman responded "It is all clear" (R. 341). 
The judge continued his comments, then sent the jury back 
to deliberations at 5:43 p.m. with the statement "after discussing 
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POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE 
SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION GIVEN THE JURY DENIED 
APPELLANT HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL, 
After deliberating for approximately four hours, the jury 
notified the judge that they were at an impasse and unable to reach 
a decision (R. 340-341). The judge recalled the members and made a 
series of oral remarks, instructing them that they were to return to 
the jury room and reach a decision (See Addendum A). The judge 
informed the jury foreman that he would answer any legal or 
procedural questions, if that were what was causing the difficulty. 
The foreman responded "It is all clear" (R. 341). 
A. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT THE USE OF SUPPLEMENTAL 
INSTRUCTIONS AFTER A JURY ANNOUNCES ITS INABILITY 
TO REACH A VERDICT. 
In Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), the United 
States Supreme Court upheld the giving of a supplemental instruction 
to a jury which had reached an impasse. As the Utah Supreme Court 
acknowledged in a footnote in the recent case of State v. Medina, 56 
U.A.R. 17, P.2d (Utah 1987), 
"In the years since Allen was decided, many 
courts have expressed concern about the continued 
propriety of the instruction because of its 
perceived tendency to pressure jurors to give up 
their sincere convictions simply because a 
majority takes a different view" (citations 
omitted). 
Id. at 19 (footnote 1). 
The controversy surrounding the "dynamite" or Allen charge 
focuses on the coercive nature of such instructions and the 
resulting deprivation of a fair trial where jurors are pressured 
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in forming or reexamining their views on the issues before them or 
(2) states or implies that if the jury fails to agree the case will 
necessarily be retried" Id, at 1006 (Addendum D). In a lengthy 
discussion, that court pointed out: 
we find that Allen-type instructions have been 
subjected to a withering barrage of attacks, 
largely on the grounds they are coercive or 
inaccurate. Although no opinion of the United 
States Supreme Court has addressed a challenge to 
this charge since the original Allen case, 3 
federal circuits and at least 22 states have 
disapproved the instruction. (footnotes omitted). 
Id. at 1002-1003. 
The Gainer court also pointed out that the American Bar Association 
recommends that courts not use the instruction A The ABA recommends 
that if the jury appears to be deadlocked, the Court may give or 
repeat an instruction similar to the instruction set forth in 
Addendum E. 
1 The Gainer Court pointed out in footnote 9: 
In so recommending, the American Bar Association 
(ABA) promulgated the following standard: 
"5.4 Length of deliberations: deadlocked jury. 
"(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, 
the court may give an instruction which informs 
the jury: 
"(i) that in order to return a verdict, each 
juror must agree thereto; 
"(ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one 
another and to deliberate with a view to reaching 
an agreement, if it can be done without violence 
to individual judgment; 
"(iii) that each juror must decide the case for 
himself, but only after an impartial 
consideration of the evidence with his fellow 
jurors; 
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In the present case, Mr. Kotz contends that after the jury 
informed the Court that it had reached an impasse, and clarified 
that the deadlock was based on an inability to agree on a verdict 
and was not on a procedural or legal question, the Court should not 
have given a supplemental instruction to the jury or, at the very 
most, any supplemental instruction should have been similar to that 
recommended by the American Bar Association. The Court had given a 
similar instruction at the close of the evidence (Addendum E) and a 
repetition of such instruction after the jijiry announced its deadlock 
is the maximum comment by a judge which should be tolerated. 
Permitting a trial judge to say anything other than a repetition of 
the instruction set forth in Addendum E aft^ er determining that the 
jurors cannot agree on a verdict opens the door for abuse and gives 
rise to a situation such as this where a ttfial judge makes a series 
of comments not previously set forth for counsel, emphasizing the 
1 (cont) "(iv) that in the course of delib^r 
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oject on Minimum 
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need and desirability for the jury to reach a decision and 
chastising the jury for its failure to do so. Such a situation 
should not be permitted/ and by rejecting such supplemental 
instructions or outlining a clear approach for trial courts this 
court would diminish the potential for the existence of such 
situations. 
B. THE SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION WAS COERCIVE. 
Various courts have addressed the coercive nature of 
supplemental instructions. In Jenkins v. United States, supra, 
after approximately two hours of deliberations, the jury indicated 
that they were unable to agree on a verdict because of insufficient 
evidence. The judge recalled the jury and informed the members, 
"You have got to reach a decision in this case." Id. at 446. The 
United States Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that in 
its context and under all of the cirucmstances, the judge's 
supplemental instruction was coercive. Id. 
The coercive effect of a supplemental instruction to the 
jury was also considered in State v. Roberts, 642 P.2d 858 (Ariz. 
1982), where the court held that the coercive impact of instructions 
would be evaluated under the "totality of the circumstances" 
standard, based on the particular facts of each case. Id. at 860. 
Applying that standard, the court found that the "Allen" instruction 
used was not coercive because the judge merely inquired into the 
numerical standing of the jury and commented that the jury would 
have to examine numerous facts before reaching a verdict. Id. at 
861. 
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In People v. Gainer, 566 P.2d 997 (Calif. 1977), the 
California Supreme Court acknowledged that reversible error would be 
found when excessive pressure was placed upon the jury to reach a 
verdict (Addendum D). Id. at 1005. The Ciurt in Gainer found that 
a judge's statement that "the case must at some time be decided", 
implied that a mistrial would result in a retrial. Id. at 1006. 
The court held that because such an "instruction misstated the law, 
the court erred in giving that portion of the charge." Id.2 
In the case at bar, the trial judcje specifically requested 
that the jury "reach a decision." (R. 340}. He stated, "these are 
the decisions that are made every day in the criminal judicial 
system. The purpose of the jury is to face the issue and make the 
decision", suggesting that it would be improper for the jury to 
cause a mistrial. (R. 340) He further chastised the jury, stating 
"(i)t is not the purpose of the jury to avoid making a hard 
decision." Judge Wilkinson also commented on the evidence when he 
stated that the jury had "been given sufficient evidence to be able 
to make a decision." (R. 340) While he adfised the jury members not 
to violate their consciences, in the same breath he stated that 
"these are the decisions that are made every day in the criminal 
judicial system." (R. 340). In both Gainer and Thomas such 
statements did not save the instructions, ifior should they in the 
present case. 
2
 In People v. Gainer, 566 P.2d 997 (Calif* 1977), the courtfs 
decision was based on two controversial features of the "Allen" 
charge. The first element criticized was "the discriminatory 
admonition directed to minority jurors to Rethink their position in 
light of the majority's views." Id. at 1002. 
-9 -
When asked whether the jury had procedural questions, the 
foreman responded "It is all clear". This exchange clarifies that 
the problem causing the impasse was differing views among the jurors 
as to the weight of the evidence and its effect on their verdict, 
and not a legal or procedural question. Under the totality of the 
circumstances in this case, the supplemental instruction was 
coercive and pressured the jury into reaching a verdict. 
Cases reaching a contrary result are distinguishable. In 
Farmer v. State, 603 P.2d 700 (Nev. 1979), the court held that the 
bailiff's comment to the jury that they continue deliberating did 
not constitute a coercive "Allen" charge. Unlike the situation 
before this court, the judge in Farmer did not even address the 
jury. In State v. Villafuerte, 690 P.2d 42 (Ariz. 1984), the court 
applied the totality of the circumstances standard and found that 
the judge's order that the jury report for another day of 
deliberations was not coercive, especially where it was tempered by 
the judge's statement that, "It is not my province to say you must 
or must not arrive at a verdict." Id. at 49. 
In the case at bar, where the judge made a series of oral 
comments rather than reading a written instruction, asked the jurors 
to reach a decision, chastised them for avoiding a hard decision and 
failing to make a decision which is made daily and commented on the 
evidence by telling the jury that sufficient evidence existed to 
reach a decision, the judge pressured the jury into reaching a 
decision and thereby committed reversible error. The foreman's 
clarification that the jury did not have a procedural or legal 
-10-
question emphasized that the jury in this c^ ase was unable to reach a 
unanimous decision, but was pressured into making one by the court. 
The judge's comments during his coercive remarks that they must 
still follow their consciences and make independent decisions failed 
to undo the damage done by the coercive statements. Because the 
judge gave coercive supplemental instructions to the jury, Mr. Kotz 
was denied his right to a fair trial and the conviction should be 
reversed. 
C. THE SUPPLEMENTAL INSTRUCTION WAS GIVEN WITHOUT 
NOTICE TO COUNSEL IN VIOLATION OF THE UTAH RULES 
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. 
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly 
provides: 
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such 
earlier time as the court reasonably directs, any 
party may file written request th^t the court 
instruct the jury on the law as s^ t forth in the 
request. At the same time copies of such 
requests shall be furnished to the other 
parties. The Court shall inform qrounsel of its 
proposed actions upon the request} and it shall 
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed 
instructions, unless the parties stipulate that 
such instructions may be given orally, or 
otherwise waive this requirement. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-19(a)(1953 as amende^). 
According to the general provisions of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, the rules are to "govern the procedure in all 
criminal cases in the courts of this state* for the purpose of 
securing "simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration, and 
the elimination of unnecessary expense and delay." Utah Code Ann. 
§77-35-l(b)(1953 as amended). The purpose of the rules cannot be 
-11-
fulfilled when judges fail to adhere to the provisions. If judges 
are allowed to give surprise instructions, court proceedings are 
complicated by objections and curative instructions. Additionally, 
the goal of "fairness in administration" demands that all defendants 
should have notice of the exact content of instructions to the jury, 
especially if the instruction itself is unusual, as is the case with 
the "Allen" charge. 
The recent Utah Supreme Court decision in State v. Medina, 
56 U.A.R. 17, P.2d (Utah 1987), emphasizes the importance of 
following the dictates of Rule 19(a). In that case, the trial court 
provided counsel with a written instruction prior to instructing the 
jury. Where defense counsel knew the contents of the instruction 
and stated that she had no objection, the Utah Supreme Court refused 
to review the instruction because counsel's explicit "No objection" 
reflected possible trial strategy. 
In the case at bar, Judge Wilkinson did not provide counsel 
with copies of the instruction he intended to give the jury. The 
record indicates that counsel did not waive this requirement. 
Defense counsel did not know the exact nature of the judge's remarks 
until he made them. In addition, since the judge made a series of 
comments, rather than reading an instruction, he was able to 
emphasize certain words and statements that he would not have been 
emphasized had he been reading. 
Presenting the instruction in this manner violated Rule 
19(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Had defense counsel 
known the exact nature of the charge prior to the judge giving it, 
-12-
she might have successfully challenged the instruction. Instead, 
the error resulted in prejudice to Mr. Kot? since the judge gave an 
instruction suggesting that the jurors should be able to reach a 
decision in a situation where they had already reported that they 
were at an impasse. 
D. A FAILURE BY THIS COURT TO REVIEW THIS ISSUE 
WOULD RESULT IN MANIFEST INJUSTICE. 
Mr. Kotz contends that the issue Should be considered on 
appeal even though defense counsel did not object on the record when 
Judge Wilkinson delivered the "Allen" instruction. In State v. 
Randall, 353 P.2d 1054 (Mont. 1960), the court granted a new trial 
after holding that because the judge failed to advise counsel of the 
supplemental instruction in advance the defendant did not have an 
opportunity to object. 
Much of the instruction . . . was harmless. 
Defendant did not know of the harmful portion of 
the instruction until after it was given and of 
course it was too late to make an objection. The 
harm had already been done. Because of the 
giving of this instruction a new irial should be 
granted. 
Id. at 1058. 
Rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of 
the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury i$ instructed, 
stating distinctly the matter to which he objects 
and the ground of his objection. Not 
withstanding a party's failure to object/ error 
may be assigned to instructions ih order to avoid 
a manifest injustice. (emphasis $dded) 
Utah Code Ann. §77-35-19 (1982). 
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court held in State v. 
Kazda, 545 P.2d 190 (Utah 1976), that where there is a "substantial 
-13-
likelihood that an injustice has resulted" a defendant is excused 
for failing to object to an erroneous instruction. Id. at 192-92. 
The recent Utah Supreme Court case, State v. Medina, supra, 
is distinguishable. While Medina involved an "Allen" charge, the 
instruction was given pursuant to Rule 19. The trial judge had 
distributed a copy of the instruction to both the prosecution and 
the defense and inquired if either side had objections. Defense 
counsel stated that she had no objection to the instruction. The 
Court, in holding that the "manifest injustice" exception under 
19(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure had not been met, 
stated: 
It is true that in reliance on this provision, we 
have considered the propriety of instructions 
with respect to which an objection has not been 
met below. However, uniformly these have been 
situations where counsel for the party 
complaining on appeal merely remained silent at 
trial. 
Id. at 3. Thus,the Court noted an important distinction between a 
silent record and a statement that the party had no objection. 
In the case at bar, the Court held an in chambers 
discussion with counsel prior to giving the instruction (R. 82). 
During that discussion, defense counsel expressed her concern about 
the propriety of giving a "dynamite" charge to the jury (R. 83). 
Once back in the courtroom, the court did not ask defense counsel if 
she had any objections to the instruction. Since the judge did not 
give counsel a written instruction on which to base any objection, 
and because the instruction he ultimately made was a series of oral 
remarks rather than a specific, delineated instruction, counsel was 
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not informed of the exact nature of the instruction until after the 
judge gave it to the jury. 
Immediately after the trial, defease counsel filed a motion 
for new trial ba£ed on the improper charge^ This situation is in 
direct contrast to that Medina where defence counsel expressly 
informed the couft that she had read the instruction and had no 
objection to it. 
Failing to review the instruction in this case would result 
in manifest injustice to Mr. Kotz since th£ instruction pressured a 
deadlocked jury into convicting him. 
CONCLUSION 
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant, 
Randall Edward Kotz, seeks reversal of his convictions and remand of 
his case to the district court with an ord£r for either a new trial 
or dismissal of the charges. 
Respectfully submitted, this /^( day of May, 1987. 
DEBRAK? LOY 
Attorney for Appellant 
-7T 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, DEBRA K. LOY, hereby certify that four copies of the 
foregoing brief will be delivered to the Attorney General's Office, 
236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this /-*> 
day of May, 1987. 
MJt 
DEBRA K. 
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LOY 
Attorney for Appellant 
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(Recess). 
(The jury returned to the courtroom at 5:35 p.m.) 
THE COURT: The record may show that all 
members of the jury are present in the courtroom. 
Members of the jury the bailiff informed me that 
you indicated to him that you have not yet reached a decision 
in this matter and have indicated that you are either at an 
impasse or in a situation where you do not feel you may be 
able to reach a decision. I must infoirm you that we are going 
to talk to you concerning this and ask you to go back in the 
jury room and deliberate and reach a decision concerning this 
matter; 
That you have been given s|ufficient evidence to be 
able to make a decision; 
That you have to discuss this with each other, 
discuss the views and opinions of how each one of the jurors 
saw this and you must go over it and go over it until you are 
able to see just exactly what the evidence is and then make 
your independent judgment. 
We do not ask you to violate your conscience, but 
we do indicate to you that these are the decisions that are 
made every day in the criminal judicial system. And that is 
the purpose of the jury is to face th^ issue and make the 
decision. It is not the purpose of the jury to avoid making 
the hard decision. 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE 84107 RES. 266-032( 
COURTS BLDG 240 E 4 S (801) 535-737: 
231 JUDGE BUILDING OFF. 533-0800 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84111 
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Now I assume that you did elect one of your group 
as foreman. And are you the foreman, sir? 
JUROR WORTHEN: (Nods his head). 
THE COURT: I do not want to open this UD to 
question and answer, but I will indicate to you, sir, that if 
there is anything that is particularly bothering you as to 
procedure or as to a clarification of a point of law, then we 
may entertain a question. We would not discuss with you or 
entertain any questions concerning clarification of any evi-
dence or any discussion with you as to how we see the evidence 
You are the only ones that can discuss that and you've got to 
see the evidence yourself and discuss it among yourselves. BuJ 
if it is a question of procedure or something of that nature 
then of course we would entertain a question. 
JUROR WORTHEN: It is all clear. 
THE COURT: Then based on that, and I realize 
it is past five ofclock now, but of course it is not unusual 
for us to continue late into the evening in deliberating on 
cases. So we at this time are going, with those instructions 
are now going to ask you to return to the jury room, to get 
down to the basics of the evidence right from the first indi-
vidual that testified and go over the testimony and discuss it 
as to how each of you saw it, and weigh that testimony, weigh 
the credibility, the believability of each witness, and look 
at the various statements to see how they meet with your 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE 84107 RES. 266-0320 
COURTS BLDG 240 E 4 S (801)535-7372 
231 JUDGE BUILDING OFF 533-0800 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
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scrutiny and whether the statements were corroborated with 
other credible evidence. And after discussing them and facing 
those issues we would then hope that you would reach a fair 
and impartial decision without in an^ f way violating your con-
science. 
So with that admonition we would ask the bailiff 
to return the jury to the jury room and court will be in recess 
(The jury left the courtroom at 5:43 p.m.) 
(Recess). 
(Jury returned to the courtroom at 7:58 p.m.) 
THE COURT: The rec6rd may show that all 
members of the jury are present. 
Members of the jury have you met and selected one 
of your group as foreman? 
JUROR WORTHEN: Yes, we have. 
THE COURT: Mr. Wor|:hen, are you the foreman 
of the jury? 
JUROR WORTHEN: Yesi 
THE COURT: Have you deliberated and reached 
a decision? 
JUROR WORTHEN: Yes|. 
THE COURT: Would you hand the verdicts to 
the court bailiff. 
I would ask the clerk of! the court to read the 
verdict. 
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR I /^0S2$S$\
 A 
385 BRAHMA DRIVE 84107 RES 266-0320 Lf Z Z I ^ A r \ f 
COURTS BLDG 240 E 4 S (801) 535-7(572 ft/ fts/U&( | S l O 
231 JUDGE BUILDING OFF 533-080J0 0 F*g~~5^W 
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DEBRA K. LOY 
Attorney for Defendant 
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-5444 
$alt Lake County, Utah 
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Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff 
-V-
RANDELL KOTZ, 
Defendant. 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
Cas^ No. CR86-1212 
Comes now the defendant, RANDELL KOTZ, by and through 
counsel of record, DEBRA K. LOY, and moves the Court to grant the 
defendant a new trial on the grounds the Court erroneously 
instructed the jury concerning its inability to reach a verdict 
after reasonable deliberation and indication by the foreman that the 
jury was divided and deadlocked. 
The defendant specifically alleges it was error for the 
Court to instruct the jury orally without (submitting the proposed 
instruction to counsel as required by Rule 19, Utah Rules of 
Criminal Proceddure. The defendant further alleges error in the 
substance of the instruction given as being likely to cause a juror 
to abandon his convictions in order to pldase the Court, and that 
such instruction is a denial of defendant's right to trial by jury. 
In the only Utah case found on this point/State v. 
Zimmermany IP.2d 962 (Utah 1931), the Court refused a new trial on 
similar circumstances, on the grounds said remarks of the Court were 
not excepted to. The instant case differs however in that defense 
counsel, while not excepting after the remark or instruction of the 
Court, requested no further instruction be given, requested the 
opportunity to review the instruction to be given by the Court and 
requested the opportunity to prepare a written instruction before 
the jury was addressed. All of said requests were denied. Further, 
said remarks in the instant case were sufficiently lengthy and 
indicated great impatience with the jurys1 deadlock and was 
therefore manifest error which compelled the jury to return a 
verdict. (See State v. Zimmerman, dissenting opinion by Justice 
Straup.) 
The error was substantial in the instant case based on the 
lack of overwhelming evidence of guilt, invaded the province of the 
jury and impacted the verdict. 
All necessary evidence for consideration of this motion by 
the trial Court exists in the record of the proceedings at the point 
the Court orally instructed the jury. 
Defendant has attached hereto the only Utah authority to be 
found on this issue and a summary of the law of other 
jurisdictions. 
DATED this j^f\ day of September, 1986. 
iMf^JL 
DEBRA K. LOY 
Attorney for Defendant 
\ . ; N ^ 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
TO THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE CLERK OF THE COURT: 
You and each of you please take notice that the above 
entitled matter will come on regularly for bearing on the 3rd day of 
October, 1986, at the hour of 2:30 p.m. before the Honorable Homer 
F. Wilkinson, Third District Court Judge, please govern yourselves 
accordingly. 
DATED this day of September, 1986. 
is\.a^ 
DEBRA K. LOY 
Attorney for Defendant 
DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the County Attorney's 
Office, 231 East Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah this day of 
September, 1986. 
^a?u^~ 
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ADDENDUM C 
[3] 
STATE v. THOMAS 
v^ Cite as 342 P.2d 197 
Plaintiff contends that because "the ^ the learned trial court 
above statute does not specifically enum-
erate—as one of the grounds of appeal— 
the Board's refusal to give her a license 
for failing to make a passing grade, there-
by she has the right to base her review in 
the superior court upon the Administrative 
Review Act. The argument is advanced 
that the purpose of the last named Act 
"is to grant the right of appeal from 
administrative orders and decisions, 
and must be deemed to complement 
those powers or acts previously en-
acted which provide for judicial re-
view but do not provide for a definite 
procedure." (Emphasis supplied.) 
This position appears to us to be wholly 
untenable as surely the legislature did not 
intend to permit a disgruntled applicant to 
jump from the one Act to the other. 
Moreover, it is a well recognized rule of 
statutory construction that where special 
provisions of a statute deal with the same 
subject as a general statute, the special 
provision prevails. Moeur v. Chiricahua 
Ranches Co., 48 Ariz. 226, 241, 61 P.2d 
163. 
It should be noted that the Administra-
tive Review Act expressly limits the right 
of review thereunder to situations where 
no other relief is available. We quote: 
"Sec. 12-902. Scope of article 
"A. This article applies to and gov-
erns every action to review judicially 
a final decision of an administrative 
agency except the state department of 
public welfare, or where the act creat-
ing or conferring power on an agency 
or a separate act provides for judicial 
rcz'iczv of the agency decisions and 
prescribes a definite procedure for the 
review" (Emphasis supplied.) 
[4,5] The Beauty Culture Act, giving it 
a
 reasonable and logical construction, we 
believe provided a remedy of review for 
"*c plaintiff under the particular circum-
stances herein shown, as well as prescribing 
* definite procedure to follow. We hold 
Ariz. 197 
was therefore cor-
rect in dismissing the cpmplaint 
Judgment affirmed. 
PHELPS, C. J., andjSTRUCKMEYER, 
JOHNSON and BERNSTEIN, J J , con-
cur. 
KEY NUMBER SYSTEM/ 
so *W-
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m Ariz. 161 
STATE of Arizona, Appellee, 
v. | 
Albert D. THOMAS, Appellant 
No. 1112. 
Supreme Court of Arizona, 
July 20, J1959. 
Defendant was convicted in the Su-
perior Court of Cochise County, J. Mercer 
Johnson, J., of manslaughter, and he ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, J. Smith 
Gibbons, Superior Court Judge, held that 
use of Voeckell instruction will no longer 
be tolerated and approved by Supreme 
Court. 
Reversed and remanded with direction. 
1. Criminal Law G=>844(l) 
There was no merit to state's conten-
i 
tion that defendant in homicide prosecution 
had waived and made no valid objection to 
Voeckell instruction. 
2. Criminal Law <§=>79ft(l), 863(2), 865(1) 
Voeckell instruction, in light of sur-
rounding circumstances under which it is 
given, should not overemphasize impor-
tance of agreement, suggest that any juror 
surrender his independent judgment, or say 
or do anything from which jury could pos-
sibly infer that court is indicating anxiety 
for or demanding some verdict, or sub-
jecting jury to hardships of long delibera-
tions. 
;198 Ariz. 342 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
. 3. Criminal Law <§=>865(l), M74(l) 
Under circumstances under which it 
was given, Voeckell instruction could have 
implied to jury the court's anxiety for it to 
arrive at some verdict and therefore giving 
of such instruction would require reversal 
of manslaughter conviction. 
5. Criminal Law @»798(l), 863(2), 865(1) 
Use of Voeckell instruction will no 
longer be tolerated and approved by Su-
preme Court. 
Flynn & Allen, Phoenix, for appellant. 
Robert Morrison, Atty. Gen., James H. 
Green, Jr., Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Lloyd 
C. Helm, County Atty., John G. Pidgeon, 
Deputy County Atty., Bisbee, for appellee. 
from which reasonable persons f 
honestly disagree as to who was th 
gressor. 
After six days of trial the case was 
mitted to the jury at 3:20 p. m. on Ma 
1956. At 12:00 o'clock midnight the'J 
called the jury into open court and 
following proceedings were had: •'•»*•' 
"The Court: Let the record sho 
the presence of the defendants and 
attorneys and the jury, of cours 
Members of the jury, I asked the bafli 
to bring you down. Who is the fo? 
• man, incidentally? • : 
:
 "The Foreman: I am, your honor 
'The Court: "Do you think you ar 
going to be able to arrive at a verdi 
in this matter? A. We were wo 
dering if we could—if it was pe 
missible for the jury and you to met 
"Q. No. A. Well, we didn't kno^ 
We were doubtful. *-."* 
"Q. No. That would be very im 
proper to do that. A. And if ri 
speaking for the jury, we feel th 
there is not enough evidence— -
"Q. I don't want you to tell me. 
What I want to know is whether you 
think it is possible to arrive at a ver 
diet. A. I don't. r 
"Q. Let me ask the rest of the juK 
ors, is it the opinion of all of you that 
you cannot arrive at a verdict? (Sev-; 
cral Jurors) A. Yes. k 
"Q. That seems to be the general 
concensus of opinion ? Do you believe 
if I sent you back for further delibera-
tion that you might possibly arrive at a 
verdict? A. Providing we had one 
law of the court read to us again. .£ 
"Q. Well, do you think it would 
help if the instructions were re-read to 
you? A. I do. 
"Q. Do the rest of the jurors th.ii
 r 
it would help ? (A Juror) A. No sir. 
"Q. You don't think it would make: 
any difference? A. No sir. ,r-
"Q. When I gave my instructions 
you probably noticed I had the court 
J. SMITH GIBBONS, Superior Court 
Judge. 
Albert D. Thomas, appellant, and his 
wife, Ellora Thomas, were jointly charged 
with murder in the first degree of one 
Frank Crane. The wife was acquitted 
and appellant, hereinafter called defend-
ant, was convicted of manslaughter and 
sentence imposed. We consider that the 
only serious question to be determined is 
whether or not the learned trial court erred 
in giving what is herein called the Voeckell 
instruction, under the facts and circum-
stances shown by the record in this case. 
It is undisputed that Frank Crane was 
shot and killed in a gun battle between de-
cedent and his son, John Crane, on the one 
hand, and the defendant and his wife on the 
other, during which many shots were fired 
by both sides. There is a direct conflict 
on virtually every material fact in issue. 
The state asserts the first shots came from 
the Thomas truck and the defendant in-
sists the Cranes started the shooting and he 
killed Frank Crane in self-defense. There 
is evidence supporting each of these claims 
4. Criminal Law <§=>798(l), 863(2), 865(1) 
When and wherever use of Voeckell 
instruction is called into question, it must 
stand or fall upon facts and circumstances 
of particular case. 
rift 
X. 
STATE v. THOMAS 
Cite as 342 P.2d 197 
reporter record them on the machine, 
-nd it wouldn't be too much difficulty 
to have them played back to you.- If 
. you think it would be of some assist-
ance I would be glad to do that. A. 
\Ve could try it. 
"(Foreman) I think it would be 
worth a trial." 
"(Court) All right, Mr. NefT, can 
you set up your machine and do that." 
"(The court's instructions were 
played back.) 
"(Court) All right, members of the 
jury* * a m £>o m£ t 0 &*ve v o u * u r t n e r 
instructions in this case. You are fur-
ther instructed, members of the jury, 
that although the verdict to which each 
juror agrees must, of course, be his own 
verdict and the result of his own con-
victions and not a mere acquiescence 
in the conclusion of his fellows, yet in 
order to bring twelve minds to a unani-
mous result you must examine the ques-
tion submitted to you with candor and 
with proper regard and deference to 
the opinions of each other. 
"There is no reason to suppose that 
this case will ever be submitted to 
twelve more intelligent, more impar-
tial or more competent jurors to de-
cide it, or that more or clearer evi-
dence will be produced on one side or 
the other. With this in view it is 
your duty to decide this case if you 
can without yielding your conscientious 
convictions. In conferring together 
you ought to pay proper attention to 
each other's opinion and listen with a 
disposition to be convinced by other's 
arguments, and on the other hand if 
a larger number of your panel are for 
conviction, a dissenting juror should 
consider whether a doubt in his own 
mind is a reasonable one which makes 
no impression on the minds of so many 
jurors equally honest, equally intelli-
gent with himself who have heard the 
same evidence, with the same oath; 
and if on the other hand the majority 
are for the defendant, the minority 
Ariz, xyy 
should ask themselves whether they 
may not and ought to reasonably doubt ' 
seriously the correctness of a judg-
ment which is not concurred in by most 
of those with whom tney are associated 
and distrust the weigfht and sufficiency 
of that evidence wh|ch fails to carry 
conviction to the min^ ds of their fellow 
jurors." 
At 12:55 a, m. the jury retired for fur-
ther deliberations; at 2:30 a. m. the jurors 
requested information regarding the ver-
dicts submitted, and were informed by the 
court that they should separately decide the 
guilt or innocence of each defendant. 
It is reasonable to assume from this rec-
ord that at least a partj of the time between 
12:55 a. m., when deliberations were re-
sumed upon giving the Voeckell instruc-
tion, and 2:30 a. m., when they requested 
and received information as to the per-
missible forms of veifdicts, was consumed 
in a discussion of thiis particular problem. 
The announced inability to arrive at a ver-
dict was thereupon resolved and agreement 
reached in a comparatively short time after 
such instruction was given. 
[1] The defendant assigns as error the 
giving of this instruction at the time and 
under the circumstances of the case, con-
sidering the gravity of the charge, the 
nature of the defense, the complexity of 
the issues, the length! of time the jury had 
been deliberating, and failure of the court 
to advise that they! could retire for the 
night and resume deliberations the follow-
ing day. The state oifi the other hand points 
out that the instruction is proper and has 
been approved by t|iis court in State r . 
Voeckell, 69 Ariz. 145, 210 P.2d 972; State 
v. Lubetkin, 78 Ariz; 91, 271 P.2d 520, and 
should be upheld. {The state's contention 
that the defendant I waived and made no 
valid objection thereto is without merit in 
this case. 
Subsequent to the filing of this appeal 
we again considered and approved in prin-
ciple this controversial instruction in State 
v. Craft, 85 Ariz. 143, 333 P.2d 728. Jus-
tice Windes, speaking in a unanimous opin-
2 0 0 Ariz. 342 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
ion, specially concurred in by Justice Udall 
and Justice Struckmeyer, said, 333 P.2d at 
page 731: 
"There may be circumstances that 
would render this instruction invalid. 
* * * . 
« * * * j t -s n o t imperative that 
the instruction be given at all; but 
if it is to be given, the circumstances 
should be carefully considered to the 
end that there is no possibility the jury 
could infer that the court is indicating 
" anxiety for or demanding some verdict 
or is imposing upon the jury the hard-
ship of unreasonably lengthy delibera-
tion." 
[2] The pitfalls and dangers to be 
avoided and the safeguards to be observed 
in giving this instruction are clearly out-
lined by Justice Windes in the Craft case 
and the dissenting opinion of Justice Udall 
in the Voeckell case. This instruction, 
in the light of the surrounding circum-
stances under which it is given, should not 
overemphasize the importance of an agree-
ment, suggest that any juror surrender his 
independent judgment, or say or do any-
thing from which the jury could possibly 
infer that the court is indicating anxiety 
for or demanding some verdict, or sub-
jecting the jury to the hardships of long 
deliberations. 
The facts in the instant case show that 
the jury, after a long day of trial and de-
liberation, were summoned to and interro-
gated in open court at midnight as to the 
possibility of arriving at a verdict. Their 
request to confer with the court, the fore-
man's statement "We feel that there is not 
enough evidence * * * " (interrupted by 
the Judge), statements they could not agree, 
the court's suggestion to repeat the instruc-
tions and the playing of the record of the 
instructions formerly given, did in our 
opinion create an atmosphere of receptiv-
ity in the minds of the jury to any sug-
gestion that would assist them in solving 
the problem at hand. Without request or 
notice the court gave the Voeckell. 
tion and concluded with this J 
"With this instruction * * * } 
may retire * * * for further 'de 
tions." (Emphasis supplied.) 
[3] In the hour and thirty-five 
that followed it would appear that 
sue upon which information was re 
at 2:30 a. m. was the main bone of 
tion during that time. This matter 
explained by the court only ten minu 
required to reach their verdict, 
convinced that the giving of the 
instruction under the salient facts 
could and did infer to the jury the 
anxiety for it to arrive at some vef. 
[4] Defendant's request that this 
reconsider the Voeckell instructio 
adopt the view advanced by Justice 
in his dissenting opinion thereto „h 
ceived consideration by us. W e . / 
concede that a close reading anct 
thereof, sentence by sentence, does n 
veal any misstatement of the law.;J 
now appears that the old adage refe~ 
by Justice Udall—"proof of the pudd 
in the eating"—aptly applies. [69" 
145, 210 P.2d 983.] This instructio 
been before us four t'mss. Whe 
- * 
wherever its use is called into qu 
it must stand or fall upon the facts an 
cumstances of each particular case. ^ 
given, and we believe each use will gi 
harassment and distress in the admi 
tion of justice. No rule of thumb 
cumscribe definite bounds of whea 
where, or under what circumstanc" 
should be given or refused. 
[5] It now appears that its con"* 
use will result in an endless chain1 
cisions, each link thereof tempered 
forged with varying facts and circunr 
. • •fli-
es and welded with ever-changinglj 
sonalities of the appellate court. 'T^. 
not in keeping with sound justice arf 
preservation of human liberties and $ 
ty. We are convinced that the evil 
outweigh the benefits, and decree thai 
use shall no longer be tolerated a~ 
proved by this court. •<> 
Reversed and remanded with direction to 
^jjt defendant a new trial. 
PHELPS, C. J., and STRUCKMEYER, 
pDALL and BERNSTEIN, JJ., concur. 
.VOTE: Justice J. MERCER JOHNSON 
L*n<r disqualified, Honorable J. SMITH 
GIBBONS, Superior Court Judge of 
Apache County, was called to sit in his 
Head, and participated in the determination 
0f this cause. 
*ET MUMKR SYSTEM, V 
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WHIIam Ralph GRIFFIN and John Joseph 
Hour.han, Individually, and in the i\ght 
and on the behalf of the electors and mem-
bers of the Democratic Party of the State 
of Arizona and in the rfght and on behalf 
of the citizens and electors of the State 
of Arizona, Appellants, 
v. 
A. P. (Jack) BUZARD, Appellee. 
No. 6776. 
Supreme Court of Arizona. 
July 15, 1039. 
Rehearing Denied Sept. 22, 1959. 
Primary election contest. The Su-
perior Court, Maricopa County, R. C. Stan-
ford, Jr., J., rendered judgment dismissing 
statement of primary election contest and 
contestors appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Udall, J., held that complaint alleging that 
name of party, whose name was similar to 
that of candidate for nomination; was 
P'accd on ballot for purpose of deceiving 
voters stated valid election contest. 
Reversed with directions. 
1. Elections <§»269 
Election contests are purely statutory, 
unknown to the common law, and are 
"either actions at law nor suits in equity, 
GRIFFIN v. BUZARD Ariz. . 2 0 1 
Cite as 342 P.2d 201 
2. Elections <S»I54(9) » -
In primary election contest initiated by 
qualified electors against contestee with 
purity of elections as its goal, candidate 
who was defeated by alleged deception was 
not an indispensable party and only neces-
sary parties were named contestors and 
party whose nomination was being con-
tested. AJR.S. § 16-1201 et seq. 
3. Elections C^ 154(2) 
Even if there were defects in primary 
nominations papers of defeated candidate 
and he may have been an illegal candidate, 
such fact would not avoid effect of statu-
tory grounds of contesting successful can-
didate's nomination, nor defeat allegations 
found in complaint that deception was 
practiced and true |will of electorate could 
not be ascertained. A.R.S. §§ 16-1201 to 
16-1203. 
4. Elections <©=>l54(9'/2) 
In determining sufficiency of statement 
of primary election contest on motion to 
dismiss, allegations must be treated as true, 
and whether they are susceptible of proof 
at trial does not concern court, all intend-
ments lie in favpr of pleading and not 
against it, and mbtion to dismiss should 
not be granted unless the relief sought 
could not be sustained under any possible 
theory. A.R.S. § 16-1201 et seq. 
5. Elections €=154^10) 
Primary election contest brought by 
electors with purity of elections as its 
goal was not a criminal action against 
contestee and high degree of proof requir-
ed to convict was not essential. A.R.S. § 
16-1201 et seq. 
6. Elections <©=»154(9«/2) 
Complaint filed by electors, who con-
tended that filing of candidate whose name 
was the same as that of another candidate 
except for middle initial was for purpose 
of deceiving voters, stated valid primary 
election contest uyider statute to effect that 
electors may contest election if person 
whose right is contested has committed any 
»
l|t are special proceedings. A.R.S. § 16- offense against the elective franchise. A, 
1 't~\ i _ i « . _ ~ ^ - - — ~ ^ 1201 subd. A. 
312 P 2d—13% 
R.S. § 16-1201 tfc sea. 
ADDENDUM D 
PEOPLE v. 
Cite as 566 
139 Cal Rptr 861 
The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Robert GAINER, Jr., Defendant 
and Appellant.* 
Cr. 19660. 
Supreme Court of California, 
In Bank. 
Aug. 31, 1977. 
Rehearing Denied Oct. 13,1977. 
Defendant was convicted before the 
Superior Court, Contra Costa County, Max 
Wilcox, Jr., J., of murder, and he appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Mosk, J., held that: (1) 
trial court erred in submitting Allen charge 
which encouraged jurors to consider numer-
ical division or preponderance of opinion on 
jury in forming or reexamining their views 
on issues before them and which stated or 
implied that if jury failed to agree the case 
would necessarily be retried, and (2) Su-
preme Court's ruling would apply to instant 
matter and all cases not final as of date of 
court's decision. 
Reversed. 
Clark, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
1. Criminal Law <s=> 1043(1) 
Defense counsel, who had not been in-
formed of trial court's intention to submit 
supplemental Allen charge, was not re-
quired to interrupt trial court's charge at 
every controversial phase in order to pre-
serve his objection thereto; defense coun-
sel's objection immediately after jury 
retired preserved the issue for appellate 
review. 
2. Criminal Law <s=>857(l) 
General rule that conclusions to be 
reached in a case will be induced only by 
evidence and arguments in open court ap-
plies no less to juries than to judges. 
3. Criminal Law <s=>857(l) 
Both People and defendant have right 
to individual judgment of each juror on 
issue of guilt. 
* Editor's Note The opinion of the Supreme 
Court of California in In re Roger S published 
in the advance sheets at this citation (566 
P 2d 997) was withdrawn from the bound vol-
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4. Criminal Law <*=>857(jl) 
Minority jurors have no greater duty to 
reexamine their views than do majority jur-
ors. 
5. Criminal Law <s=>863(2) 
Courts should not hesitate to condemn 
instruction which carrie$ a strong implica-
tion that jurors should Consider preponder-
ance of votes in forming their views simply 
because the charge subtly avoids an explicit 
statement of that proposition. 
6. Criminal Law e=>86 (^2) 
Encouragement given by Allen charge 
to minority jurors' acquiescence in position 
of majority jurors is manifestly incompati-
ble with requirement! of independently 
achieved jury unanimity. 
7. Criminal Law $=>8$3(2) 
Portion of Allen charge instructing 
that dissenting jurors should consider 
whether doubt in his or her mind is a rea-
sonable one, which makes no impression on 
minds of so many men or women equally 
honest, equally intelligent with himself or 
herself is objectionable as a judicial attempt 
to inject illegitimate considerations into 
jury debate and as an appeal to dissenting 
jurors to abandon their own independent 
judgment of case against defendant. 
8. Criminal Law <s=>$65(l) 
Portion of Allen charge admonishing 
minority jurors to consider numerical divi-
sion or preponderance of opinion on jury in 
forming or reexamining their views on is-
sues before them constitutes excessive pres-
sure on dissenting jurors to acquiesce in a 
verdict. 
9. Criminal Law <s=» 1174(1) 
Reversible error may be found in exces-
sive pressure upon jury to reach a verdict, 
whatever its nature, rather than no verdict 
at all. 
10. Criminal Law <fc=>863(2) 
In prosecution for murder, trial court 
erred in submitting Allen charge which en-
couraged jurors to consider numerical divi-
sion or preponderance of opinion on jury in 
ume at the request of the court and will be re-
published together with a modification of the 
opinion at a later date 
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forming or reexamining their views on the 
issues before them. 
11. Criminal Law <s=>867 
; It is not true that a criminal case must 
at some time be decided; possibility of 
. hung jury is inevitable by-product of unani-
mous verdict requirement. • 
12. Criminal Law to863(2) 
'In prosecution for murder, trial court 
erred in submitting Allen charge which 
stated "the case must at some time be de-
cided," in view of fact that instruction im-
plying that hung jury would assuredly re-
sult in retrial misstated the law. 
13. Criminal Law to863(2) 
It is error for trial court to give an 
instruction which either (1) encourages jur-
ors to consider numerical division or pre-
ponderance of opinion on jury in forming or 
reexamining their views on the issues be-
fore them, or (2) states or implies that if 
jury fails to agree the case will necessarily 
be retried. 
14. Criminal Law to863(2) 
* It is error for trial court to give in-
struction which refers to expense and incon-
venience of a retrial. 
15. Courts «=» 100(1) 
, Three considerations are relevant in de-
termining retroactivity of judicially de-
clared rules of criminal procedure: purpose 
to be served by new standards, extent of 
reliance by law enforcement authorities on 
old standards, and effect on administration 
of justice of a retroactive application of 
new standards. 
16. Courts *=> 100(1) 
Rule announced by Supreme Court, 
that it is error for trial court to give in-
struction which encourages juror to con-
sider numerical division or preponderance 
of opinion on jury in forming or reexamin-
ing their views on issues before them, or 
which states or implies that if jury fails to 
agree the case will necessarily be retried 
would apply to matter before Supreme 
Court and to all cases not final as of date of 
Supreme Court's decision. 
17. Criminal Law to 1174(1) 
.i. A conviction following Allen charge 
which encourages jurors to consider numer-* 
ical division or preponderance of opinion on'' 
jury in forming or reexamining their views'^ 
on issues before them is a miscarriage of 
justice, and judgment of conviction must be 
reversed. 
18. Criminal Law toll74(l) *** 
A per se rule of reversal is not required 
when only erroneous statement included in* 
otherwise correct instructions is an implica-! 
tion that if jury fails to agree the case will 
necessarily be retried; in such cases a mis-' 
carriage of justice will be avoided if review*-* 
ing court makes further examination of all 
circumstances under which charge was giv-" 
en to determine whether it was reasonably 
probable that result more favorable to de-
fendant would have been reached in ab-
sence of the error. . ^ ;;': 
19. Criminal Law to394.1(3) *" 
Where police officer improperly pro- | j 
longed initial interview of defendant after 
defendant had declined to waive Miranda 
rights, but statements obtained from de-
fendant at that time were ambiguous, if not 
completely benign, after such initial inter- ^ 
view defendant was permitted to meet with 
his parents in private, and after such meet-
ing with his parents, defendant agreed to 
show officer location of his revolver, de-
fendant's consent to show officer his revolv-
er was not the result of exploitation of 
earlier interrogation so as to require exclu-' 
sion of defendant's weapon. 
20. Criminal Law «=>641.13(1) 
It is defendant's burden to show coun-
sel's incompetence. 
21. Criminal Law <s=>641.13(2) * S -
Fact that defense counsel consented to 
police search for defendant's gun after
 t 
meeting for approximately ten minutes 
with defendant did not support conclusion 
that defendant had been denied effective 
assistance of counsel. U.S.C.A.Const 
Amend. 6. 
:tZ 
Craig Harris Collins, San Mateo, under 
appointment by the Supreme Court, for de-^  
fendant and appellant. - < 
\ 
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Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Jack R. 
Winkler, Chief Asst Atty. Gen., Edward P. 
O'Brien, Asst. Atty. Gen., William D. Stein, 
Derald E. Granberg and David Schneller, 
Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and re-
spondent. 
MOSK, Justice. 
In January 1975 defendant Robert Gain-
er, Jr., was tried in the Superior Court of 
Contra Costa County on a charge of mur-
der. (Pen. Code, § 187.)l The taking of 
the testimony of more than 30 witnesses 
consumed 12 days, concluding on the 28th 
of January. On the 13th day of trial, at 
10:30 in the morning, the case went to the 
jury. Four times during that day the jury 
interrupted their deliberations to ask that 
various portions of the testimony be reread. 
At 5:05 p.m. the jurors were sent home 
without having reached a verdict. 
On the morning of their second day of 
deliberations the jurors again heard testi-
mony read by request, and returned to the 
jury room. At 4:45 p.m., when the jury 
sent in a note asking for the rereading of 
an instruction, the trial judge inquired as to 
the numerical division of the panel. He 
was informed that the last ballot stood nine 
to three. The jurors, having failed to 
agree, again were excused and permitted to 
return home for the night. 
On the morning of January 31, the 15th 
day of trial and the 3d day of deliberations, 
the jury heard one witness* testimony read 
and continued deliberating. At 11 a.m. the 
jurors were reassembled in the courtroom 
where the foreman indicated they were 
having difficulty reaching a verdict. The 
judge again inquired as to their numerical 
count, and the foreman replied, "Eleven to 
one." At this point the judge read the 
following instruction: 
"Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury: 
"In a large proportion of cases and per-
haps strictly speaking, in all cases, absolute 
certainty cannot be attained or expected. 
Although the verdict to which a juror 
agrees must, of course, be his own verdict, 
the result of his own convictions and not a 
mere' acquiescence in the conclusion of his 
or her fellows, yet in oifder to bring twelve 
minds to a unanimous j-esult, you must ex-
amine the questions submitted to you with 
candor and with a proper regard and defer-
ence to the opinions of each other. You 
should consider that the case must at some 
time be decided, that you are selected in the 
same manner and from the same source 
from which any future jury must be select-
ed, and there is no reason to suppose the 
case will ever be submitted to twelve men 
or women more intelligent, more impartial 
or more competent to decide it, or that 
more or clearer evidence will be produced 
on the one side or the other. And, with this 
view, it is your duty to decide the case, if 
you can conscientiously do so. 
"In order to make a decision more practi-
cable, the law imposes the burden of proof 
on one party or the other in all cases. In 
the present case, the burden of proof is on 
the People of the State of California to 
establish every part of it beyond a reasona-
ble doubt. And, if in any part of it you are 
left in doubt, the defendant is entitled to 
the benefit of the doubt and must be ac-
quitted. But in conferring together, you 
ought to pay proper respect to each other's 
opinions and listen with a disposition to be 
convinced to each other's arguments. 
"And, on the otljer hand, if much the 
larger of your panel are for a conviction, a 
dissenting juror should consider whether a 
doubt in his or her own mind is a reasonable 
one, which makes no impression upon the 
minds of so many men or women equally 
honest, equally intelligent with himself or 
herself, and [who] have heard the same 
evidence with the same attention and with 
an equal desire to arrive at the truth and 
under the sanction of the same oath. 
"And, on the other hand, if a majority are 
for acquittal, the minority ought seriously 
to ask themselves whether they may not 
reasonably and ought not to doubt the cor-
rectness of a judgment, which is not con-
curred in by most of those with whom they 
are associated, and distrust the weight or 
sufficiency of that evidence which fails to 
1. Defendant was also charged with being arm- offense and with using a firearm in committing 
ed with a deadly weapon at the time of the the crime. (Pen. Code, §§ 12022, 12022.5.) 
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carry conviction to the minds of their fel-
lows. 
. "That is given to you as a suggestion of 
the theory and rationale behind jurors com-
ing to a decision one way or the other. 
"So, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, 
I'm going to ask you—after lunch—to 
retire and continue with your deliberations 
and see if it is at all possible to resolve the 
matter. 
"I understand that, of course, on occa-
sions it is impossible to do so, but—based 
upon the instruction I have just given to 
you—I would appreciate that after lunch— 
if you would go back and resume your 
deliberations and see if you can arrive at a 
verdict and that the deadlock can be bro-
ken." 
. After lunch—a total of two hours and 55 
minutes after resuming deliberations—the 
jury returned a verdict of guilty of murder 
in the second degree, with a finding that 
defendant was armed with a deadly weapon 
at the time of the offense and that he used 
a firearm in committing the offense. 
[1] On appeal from the judgment en-
tered on this verdict, we consider for the 
first time the permissibility of the final 
instruction given to the jury shortly before 
they returned a verdict on the third day of 
deliberations.2 The instruction, which is of 
a type commonly referred to either as the 
"Allen charge" or the "dynamite charge," 
has had a controversial history since it was 
cursorily approved by the United States 
Supreme Court in the case of Allen v. Unit-
ed States (1896) 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 
41 L.Ed. 528. Because it instructs the jury 
to consider extraneous and improper fac-
tors, inaccurately states the law, carries a 
2. Defense counsel objected to the charge imme-
diately after the jury retired Nevertheless, the 
People contend that defendant "acquiesced" in 
the decision to give the instruction for a delib-
erate tactical purpose, and hence that any ob-
jection was waived. (See People v Graham 
(1969) 71 Cal 2d 303, 319, 78 Cal Rptr 217, 455 
P.2d 153 ) The People point to no expressions 
of counsel in the record which substantiate 
their speculation that Gainer's attorney "sur-
mised" that the jury stood 11 to 1 for acquittal 
and therefore acceded to the instruction in 
question To compensate for this evidentiary 
void, the People invite us to infer a deliberate 
acquiescence from defendant's failure to object 
to the instruction in advance or in mid-passage 
potentially coercive impact, and burdens 
rather than facilitates the administration of * 
justice, we conclude that further use of the^l 
charge should be prohibited in California, f 
-In reviewing defendants contention that" 
the charge was erroneous as a matter of 
law, it will be helpful to trace the history of' 
the instruction from its relatively innocuous" 
origin, through its heyday as a popular^ 
technique for extracting verdicts from 
deadlocked juries, and into its twilight 
years as a prolific generator of appellate 
controversy. In the process we shall identi-
fy and assess those aspects of the charge 
which are the central objects of defendant's 
attack. ; ; p 
Genesis of the uAllen Charge" - . v S ^ j k 
The Allen case from which the instruc- j4 
tion takes its name is a most unprepossess- -; 
ing leading authority Alexander Allen JSp*5 
was a 14-year-old boy who had been con- ~* '*" 
victed of murder. His conviction was re-
versed by the United States Supreme Court jp« 
because of a faulty jury instruction (Allen 
v. United States (1893) 150 U.S. 551, 14 
S.Ct. 196, 37 L.Ed. 1179), and after a retrialLj 
his second conviction was reversed by the 
Supreme Court because of another errone-* 
ous instruction (Allen v. United States 
(1895) 157 U.S. 675, 15 S.Ct. 720, 39 LEA 
854). After a third conviction his case went^  
again to the Supreme Court. (Allen v. 
United States (1896) 164 US 492, 17 S.Ct J 
154, 41 LEd. 528.) No counsel appeared for 
Allen, and the court declared itself "some-
what embarrassed . by the ab-
sence of a brief on the part of the plaintiff 
in error . . ." (Id. at p. 494, 17 S.Ct ^ 
at p. 154.) Nevertheless, the court did con-' 
sider 18 assignments of error in the record, ^ 
Again, however, the record fails to contradict 
defense counsel's statement, after the charge 
was read, that "I was not even asked nor was i t j 
ever indicated to me that the instruction was 
ever to be given in this case " Clearly defend- ^ 
ants cannot be required to anticipate supple-
mental instructions a judge might give, upon j 
pain of inviting error Nor was defense coun-
sel required to interrupt the judge's charge at ^ 
every controversial phrase, thereby courting 
the animosity of the jury and implying that the 
charge hurt his client's case Indeed common 
courtesy, and respect for the dignity of judicial ^ 
proceedings, caution against interruption of t J 
judge who is advising the jury -* 
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the last 2 of which concerned the instruc-
tion now known as the "Allen charge." 
The court noted that the instruction was 
"taken literally from a charge in a criminal 
case which was approved of by the Supreme 
Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth 
v. Tuey, 8 Cush. 1 . . . ." (Id. at p. 
501, 17 S.Ct. at p. 157.)3 
After paraphrasing the instruction, the 
court reasoned that "While, undoubtedly, 
the verdict of the jury should represent the 
opinion of each individual juror, it by no 
means follows that opinions may not be 
changed by conference in the jury-room. 
The very object of the jury system is to 
secure unanimity by a comparison of views, 
and by arguments among the jurors them-
selves. It certainly cannot be the law that 
each juror should not listen with deference 
to the arguments and with a distrust of his 
own judgment, if he finds a large majority 
of the jury taking a different view of the 
case from what he does himself. It cannot 
be that each juror should go to the jury-
room with a blind determination that the 
verdict shall represent his opinion of the 
case at that moment; or, that he should 
close his ears to the arguments of men who 
are equally honest and intelligent as him-
self. There was no error in these instruc-
tions." (Id. at pp. 501-502, 17 S.Ct. at p. 
157.) 
Given this procedural history, and the 
Allen court's brief treatment of the elabo-
rately crafted collection of nuances and in-
timations composing the challenged instruc-
tion, "there is little wonder that many 
doubt whether the case would not be decid-
ed differently today. [Citation.] But that 
it should have become the foundationstone 
of all modern law regarding deadlocked ju-
ries is perhaps the greatest anomaly of the 
3. The court summarized the charge as being, 
"in substance, that in a large proportion of 
cases absolute certainty could not be expected, 
that although the verdict must be the verdict of 
each individual juror, and not a mere acquies-
cence in the conclusion of his fellows, yet they 
should examine the question submitted with 
candor and with a proper regard and deference 
to the opinions of each other, that it was their 
duty to decide the case if they could conscien-
tiously do so, that they should listen, with a 
disposition to be convinced, to each other's 
arguments, that, if much the larger number 
were for conviction, a dissenting juror should 
Allen case." (United States v. Bailey (5th 
Cir. 1972) 468 F,2d 652, 666.) 
Nevertheless, the Allen charge won rela-
tively quick adoption in some 10 states. 
(See Note, An Argument for the Abandon-
ment of the Allen Charge in California 
(1975) 15 Santa Clara Law. 939, fn. 3; An-
not., 100 A.L.R.2d 177-217.) California was 
not among the early enthusiasts. Undoubt-
edly the popularity of the instruction 
stemmed from its perceived efficiency as a 
means of "blasting" a verdict out of a dead-
locked jury in a manner which had the 
imprimatur of the highest court in the 
land.4 At the same time, trial judges were 
not averse to adding their own embellish-
ments to the approved text, frequently in 
an apparent attempt to increase the intensi-
ty of the "blast." The practice arose of 
adding an observation, not included in the 
instruction originally approved in Allen, to 
the effect that "the case must at some time 
be decided" (see, e. g., People v. Ozene 
(1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 905, 911, 104 Cal.Rptr. 
170; United States v. Brown (7th Cir. 1969) 
411 F.2d 930, 933; Huffman v. United 
States (5th Cir. 1962) 297 F.2d 754, 759 
(cone, and dis. opn. of Brown, J.)) or that 
the jury had been "selected in the same 
manner and from the same source from 
which any future jury must be selected, and 
there is no reason to suppose the case will 
ever be submitted to twelve men or women 
more intelligent, more impartial or more 
competent to decide it . ." (Ozene, 
supra, at p. 911 of 27 Cal.App.3d, at p 174 
of 104 Cal.Rptr.; see also Mathes, Jury 
Instructions and Forms for Federal Crimi-
nal Cases (1969) 27 F.R.D. 39, Inst No. 8.19 
at pp. 102-104) 
Thus it is somewhat imprecise to refer to 
a single Allen charge. Decades of judicial 
consider whether his doubt was a reasonable 
one which made no impression upon the minds 
of so many men, equally honest, equally intelli-
gent with himself If, upon the other hand, the 
majority was for acquittal, the minority ought 
to ask themselves whether they might not rea-
sonably doubt the correctness of a judgment 
which was not concurred In by the majority " 
(Ibid) 
4. For a survey of the more draconian measures 
which have been thought useful in procunng 
verdicts, see the discussion in United States v 
Bailey (5th Cir 1972) supra, 468 F2d 652, 665 
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improvisation have produced a variety of 
permutations and amplifications of the 
original wording, some remarkably elabo-
rate. (See, e. g., Tomoya Kawakita v. Unit-
ed States (9th Cir. 1951) 190 F.2d 506, 524-
525, fn. 17; Mathes, op. cit. supra, 27 F.R.D. 
39, 102.) Nevertheless, it is possible to iso-
late the two elements frequently found in 
such instruction—and found in the charge 
given in this case—which raise the gravest 
doubts as to their propriety. 
The first and most questionable feature is 
the discriminatory admonition directed to 
minority jurors to rethink their position in 
light of the majority's views. In the Allen 
opinion this concept is expressed in the fol-
lowing passage: "if much the larger num-
ber were for conviction, a dissenting juror 
should consider whether his doubt was a 
reasonable one which made no impression 
upon the minds of so many men, equally 
honest, equally intelligent with himself. If, 
upon the other hand, the majority was for 
acquittal, the minority ought to ask them-
selves whether they might not reasonably 
doubt the correctness of a judgment which 
was not concurred in by the majority." 
(164 U.S. at p. 501, 17 S.Ct. at p. 157.) The 
same language, with some elaboration and 
deference to female jurors, was used by the 
trial judge in the case at bar. A second 
controversial element in Allen -type instruc-
tions, not approved in Allen itself, is the 
direction given by the court below that 
"You should consider that the case must at 
some time be decided." 
. Neither of the foregoing phrases received 
judicial approval in California until 1958. 
In that year, the Court of Appeal con-
sidered a case in which the trial judge, after 
inadvertently learning that the jury stood 
11 to 1 for conviction, delivered a conven-
5. The Allen charge has also been the subject of 
intense critical commentary (See, e. g., Note, 
An Argument for the Abandonment of the Al-
len Charge m California (1975) 15 Santa Clara 
Law. 939, Note, The Allen Charge Recurring 
Problems and Recent Developments (1972) 47 
N.Y.U.L.Rev 296, Note, Due Process, Judicial 
Economy and the Hung Jury- A Reexamination 
of the Allen Charge (1967) 53 Va.lLRev. 123; 
Note, Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite. A Crit-
ical Look at the * Allen'1 Charge (1964) 31 
U.Chi.L.Rev 386) 
6. But see Lias et al v United States (1931) 284 
U.S. 584. 52 S Ct. 128, 76 LEd. 505 (per cu-
tionally embellished version of the Allen 
instruction. (People v. Baumgartner (1958) 
166 Cal.App.2d 103, 332 P.2d 366.) The 
appellate court reversed the conviction on 
the ground that under the circumstances 
the charge was coercive of the holdout jur-
or. Nevertheless, without citing Allen or 
any other authority, the court also declared 
in dictum that had the trial judge "not been 
informed to the knowledge of all as to the 
fact that the jury stood 11 to 1 for convic-
tion" the charge would have been proper, 
since it had been "worked out long ago as 
to form and ha[d] been frequently used." 
Id. at p. 108, 332 P.2d at p. 370.) On the 
basis of Baumgartner, Courts of Appeal 
also approved Allen -type charges in People 
v. Ortega (1969) 2 Cal.App.3d 884, 896, 83 
CaLRptr. 260; People v. Gibson (1972) 23 
CaLApp.3d 917, 921,101 CaLRptr. 620; Peo-
ple v. Guillen (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 976, 985, 
113 CaLRptr. 43, and People v. Terry (1974) 
38 Cal.App.3d 432, 448, 113 CaLRptr. 233, 
footnote 2. Allen itself is first cited in 
support of the charge which bears its name 
in People v. Ozene (1972) supra, 27 Cal. 
App.3d 905, 910-914, 104 CaLRptr. 170. 
However, no supplemental jury instruction 
containing either the admonition to minori-
ty jurors or the statement that "the case 
must at some time be decided" has ever 
been approved in a holding of this court. 
In evaluating the charge we also consider 
its treatment in recent decisions of other 
jurisdictions. There we find that Allen-type 
instructions have been subjected to a with-
ering barrage of attacks, largely on the 
grounds they are coercive or inaccurate.5 
Although no opinion of the United States 
Supreme Court has addressed a challenge to 
this charge since the original Allen case,1 3 
federal circuits7 and at least 22 states8 
nam); Kawakita v. United States (1952) 343 
U.S. 717, 744, 72 S.Ct. 950. 96 L.Ed. 1249; 
Johnson v. Louisiana (1972) 406 U.S. 356, 362, 
92 S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed.2d 152. 
7. These are the Third, Seventh, and District of 
Columbia Circuits. (See United States v. Fior-
avanti (3d Cir. 1969) 412 F.2d 407, cert. den. 
sub nom. Panaccione v. United States (1969) 
396 U.S. 837, 90 S.Ct. 97, 24 L.Ed.2d 88; United 
States v. Brown (7th Cir. 1969) 411 F2d 930; 
United States v Thomas (1971) 146 U S.App 
D.C. 101. 449 F.2d 1177.) 
8. State court cases which have disapproved 
Allen -type instructions, in whole or in part. 
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American Bar Association has recom-
mended abandonment of the charge.9 
Moreover, many decisions which tolerate 
continued use of the charge have done so 
grudgingly under compulsion of stare deci-
sis (e. g., 17. S. v. Bailey (5th Cir. 1972) 
supra, 468 F.2d 652, 669, affd. (1973) 480 
F.2d 518), or have sought to place curbs on 
its use. These restrictions often take the 
form of limiting the charge to the original 
language approved in Allen (see, e. g., Unit-
ed States v. Flannery (1st Cir. 1971) 451 
F.2d 880, 883; United States v. Kenner (2d 
Cir. 1965) 354 F.2d 780, 782-784; United 
States v. Rogers (4th Cir. 1961) 289 F.2d 
433), or requiring "balancing" instructions 
(see, e. g., Flannery, supra, at p. 883; Note 
On Instructing Deadlocked Juries (1968) 78 
Yale L.J. 100, 106, fn. 26, and cases cited). 
In short, the indisputable modern trend is 
to abandon Allen (U S. v. Bailey (5th Cir. 
1972) supra, 468 F2d 652, 668), and an 
examination of the impact of each of the 
crucial elements which may be found in 
include: Fields v. State (Alaska 1971) 487 P.2d 
831; State v. Thomas (1959) 86 Ariz. 161, 342 
P.2d 197; Taylor v. People (1971) 176 Colo. 
316, 490 P.2d 292; Bryan v. State (Fla.App. 
1973) 280 So.2d 25; State v. Brown (1971) 94 
Idaho 352, 487 P.2d 946; People v. Mills (1971) 
131 IU.App.2d 693, 268 N.E.2d 571; State v. 
Nicholson (La. 1975) 315 So.2d 639; State v. 
White (Me.1972) 285 A.2d 832; People v. Sulli-
van (1974) 392 Mich. 324, 220 N.W.2d 441; 
State v. Martin (1973) 297 Minn. 359, 211 
N.W.2d 765; State v. Randall (1960) 137 Mont. 
534, 353 P.2d 1054; State v. Garza (1970) 185 
Neb. 445, 176 N.W.2d 664; Azbill v. State 
(1972) 88 Nev. 240, 495 P.2d 1064; State v. 
Blake (1973), 113 N.H. 115. 305 A.2d 300; State 
v. Minns (1969) 80 N.M. 269, 454 P.2d 355; 
State v. Champagne (N.D.1972) 198 N.W.2d 
218; State v. Marsh (1971) 260 Or. 416, 490 
P.2d 491, cert. den. sub nom. O'Dell v. Oregon 
(1972) 406 U.S. 974, 92 S.Ct. 2420, 32 L.Ed.2d 
674; Commonwealth v. Spencer (1971) 442 Pa. 
328, 275 A.2d 299; State v. Patriarca (1973) 
112 R.I. 14, 308 A.2d 300; Kersey v. State 
(Tenn.1975) 525 S.W.2d 139; Kelley v. State 
(1971) 51 Wis.2d 641, 187 N.WJ2d 810; Elmer 
v. State (Wyo.1969) 463 P.2d 14. 
9. In so recommending, the American Bar Asso-
ciation (ABA) promulgated the following stan-
dard: 
"5.4 Length of deliberations; deadlocked 
jury. 
"(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, 
the court may give an instruction which in-
forms the jury: 
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instruction. The Allen -type charges demonstrates the per-
suasive justification for that sentiment. 
The Admonition to Minority Jurors 
[2,3] One of the basic ingredients in our 
traditional concept of a fair trial is a cir-
cumscription on that which the trier of fact 
may consider in reaching a verdict. " 'The 
theory of our system is tfhat the conclusions 
to be reached in a case will be induced only 
by evidence and arguments in open court 
. . . . '" (Sheppardl v. Maxwell (1966) 
384 U.S. 333, 351, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1516, 16 
L.Ed.2d 600, quoting frcfm Patterson v. Col-
orado (1907) 205 U.S. 454, 462, 27 S.Ct. 556, 
51 L.Ed. 879.) This ru e applies no less to 
juries than to judges, and the decisions of 
both this court and the United States Su-
preme Court reflect tne importance of re-
stricting the foundation for the jury's deci-
sion to the evidence and arguments present-
ed at trial. (See, e. g., ISheppard v. Maxwell 
(1966) supra, 384 U.S 333, 86 S.Ct. 1507; 
Irvin v. Dowd (1961) 366 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 
1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751; Turner v. Louisiana 
"(i) that in order to return a verdict, each 
juror must agree thereto; 
"(ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with 
one another and to deliberate with a view to 
reaching an agreement, if it can be done with-
out violence to individual judgment; 
"(hi) that each juror must decide the case for 
himself, but only after an impartial considera-
tion of the evidence with his fellow jurors; 
"(iv) that in the course of deliberations, a 
juror should not hesitate to reexamine his own 
views and change his opinion if convinced it is 
erroneous; and 
"(v) that no juror should surrender his hon-
est conviction as to the weight or effect of the 
evidence solely because of the opinion of his 
fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of re-
turning a verdict. 
"(b) If it appears to the court that the jury 
has been unable to agree, the court may require 
the jury to continue their deliberations and 
may give or repeat an instruction as provided 
in subsection (a). The court shall not require 
or threaten to require the jury to deliberate for 
an unreasonable length of time or for unreason-
able intervals. 
"(c) The jury may be discharged without 
having agreed upon a verdict if it appears that 
there is no reasonable probability of agree-
ment." (ABA Project on Minimum Standards 
for Criminal Justite, Stds. Relating to Trial by 
Jury (Approved Draft 1968) std. 5.4.) 
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(1965) 379 U.S. 466, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 
424; and Maine v. Superior Court (1968) 68 
Cal.2d 375, 66 Cal.Rptr. 724, 438 P.2d 372.) 
An equally significant principle relates to 
the right of both the People and the defend-
ant to the individual judgment of each jur-
or on the issue of guilt. (People v. Dole 
(1898) 122 Cal. 486, 495, 55 P. 581; People v. 
Wong Loung (1911) 159 Cal. 520, 535,114 P. 
829.) 
[4,5] Yet in instructing that "a dissent-
ing juror should consider whether a doubt 
in his or her own mind is a reasonable one, 
which makes no impression on the minds of 
so many men or women equally honest, 
equally intelligent with himself or herself," 
the trial judge pointedly directs the jurors 
to include an extraneous factor in their 
deliberations, i. e., the position of the ma-
jority of jurors at the moment. The one or 
more "holdout" jurors are told that in 
reaching their independent conclusions as to 
whether or not a reasonable doubt of the 
defendant's guilt exists, they are to weigh 
not only the arguments and evidence but 
also their own status as dissenters—a con-
sideration both rationally and legally irrele-
vant to the issue of guilt.10 They are thus 
deflected from their proper role as triers of 
fact, as effectively as if they had been 
instructed to consider their doubts as to 
guilt in light of their own prejudices or 
desire to go home. 
, [6] Moreover, the extraneous majoritar-
ian appeal contained in the Allen instruc-
tion interferes with the jury's task in a way 
which threatens the defendant's right under 
the California Constitution to have his guilt 
or innocence determined by the unanimous 
verdict of a jury of 12 persons. (Cal.Const., 
art. I, § 16; People v. Collins (1976) 17 
Cal.3d 687, 692, 131 Cal.Rptr. 782, 552 P.2d 
742; People v. Feagley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 338, 
350,121 Cal.Rptr. 509,535 P.2d 373.) "Una-
10. The instruction does not escape this con-
demnation because it may be interpreted as 
requiring dissenters to merely "reexamine" 
their views rather than to directly include ma-
joritarian factors in the primary calculus of 
guilt. At best this reading strains the language 
of the charge. More significantly, minority jur-
ors have no greater duty to "reexamine" their 
views than do majority jurors. Finally, we 
should not hesitate to condemn an instruction 
which carries a strong implication that jurors 
nimity obviously requires that each juror" 
must vote for and acquiesce in the verdict 
Acquiescence simply because the verdict has 
been reached by the majority is not an3 
independent judgment, and if permitted, 
would undermine the right to a unanimous" 
verdict." (People v. Superior Court (Thorn-
as) (1967) 67 Cal.2d 929, 932, 64 Cal.Rptr. 
327, 329, 434 P.2d 623.) The open encour-
agement given by the charge to such acqui-
escence is manifestly incompatible with the 
requirement of independently achieved jury 
unanimity. 
[7] It follows that even if it were possi-
ble to demonstrate that Allen's admonition 
to dissenters were without appreciable ef-
fect on a jury, it would nevertheless be ' 
objectionable as a judicial attempt to inject 
illegitimate considerations into the jury de-" 
bates and as an appeal to dissenting jurore 
to abandon their own independent judg-
ment of the case against the accused. *<; 
Beyond doubt, however, the instruction" 
has a devastating effect—otherwise it 
would not have been considered efficacious 
enough to defend through the years despite 
its obvious flaws. The pragmatic force of 
the charge has also encouraged both its 
defenders and its opponents to phrase the 
problem of its use in terms of whether or 
not it "coerces" juries to reach verdicts. 
(See, e.g., People v. Ozene (1972) supra, 27 
Cal.App.3d 905, 910-914, 104 Cal.Rptr. 170; 
Note, On Instructing Deadlocked Juries 
(1968) 78 Yale L.J. 100, 105.) 
However, if this "coercion" test is charac-
terized as a quasi-factual inquiry into" 
whether a juror did or did not surrender his
 ( 
true convictions, insuperable difficulties are J 
encountered. Courts are generally unable 
to recreate effectively the events, subjec-^  
tive and objective, occurring during jurors' 
deliberations in order to evaluate the actual ^ 
effects of an instruction.11 Nor is it clear^ 
should consider the preponderance of votes in 
forming their views simply because the charge 
subtly avoids an explicit statement of that . 
proposition. 
11. The limited admissibility of juror testimony 
under People v. Hutchinson (1969) 71 Cal2d 
342, 349, 78 Cal.Rptr. 196. 455 P.2d 132. and4 
Evidence Code section 1150, clearly does not^  
enable an effective inquiry of this type. Under 
section 1150, subdivision (a), "any otherwise 
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that even if judges were given such retro-
spective omniscience, they could agree on 
the point at which a juror was "coerced" 
into changing his vote. Given the difficul-
ties ordinarily facing such a determination, 
the duty of the courts to insure the fairness 
of criminal trials requires a broader inquiry, 
i.e., whether the instructions tend to impose 
such pressure on jurors to reach a verdict 
that we are uncertain of the accuracy and 
integrity of the jury's stated conclusion. 
This determination of whether the instruc-
tions "operate to displace the independent 
judgment of the jury in favor of considera-
tions of compromise and expediency" (Peo-
ple v. Carter (1968), 68 Cal.2d 810, at p. 817, 
69 Cal.Rptr. 297 at p. 302,442 P.2d 353 at p. 
358) is perhaps best characterized as requir-
ing a generalized assessment of the poten-
tial effect of a given instruction on the fact 
finding process, rather than as an attempt-
ed inquiry into the actual volitional quality 
of a particular jury verdict. Defendant's 
claim that the Allen charge is inherently 
coercive is thus more aptly phrased as a 
contention that the instruction simply ex-
erts "undue pressure upon the jury to reach 
a verdict." (Id. at p. 817, 69 Cal.Rptr. at p. 
302, 442 P.2d at p. 358; see also United 
States v. Seawell (9th Cir. 1977) 550 F.2d 
1159, 1163.) 
[8,9] In addition to invoking impermis-
sible considerations, the admonition to mi-
nority jurors given herein constitutes just 
such excessive pressure on the dissenting 
jurors to acquiesce in a verdict. The dissen-
admissible evidence may be received as to 
statements made, or conduct, conditions, or 
events occurring, either within or without the 
jury room, of such a character as is likely to 
have influenced the verdict improperly. No 
evidence is admissible to show the effect of 
such statement, conduct, condition or event 
upon a juror either in influencing him to assent 
to or dissent frhm the verdict or concerning the 
mental processes by which it was determined" 
(Italics added.) "Coercion," as used in this 
context, refers primarily to a process within 
the mind of the minority juror and responsive 
to statements made by the judge in open court. 
Thus, the evidence of "objective facts" admissi-
ble under section 1150 and Hutchinson (supra, 
at p. 351, 78 Cal.Rptr. 196, 455 P.2d 132) will 
not resolve the issue. (See also ABA Project 
on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, 
Stds. Relating to Trial by Jury (Approved Draft 
1968) supra, commentary to std. 5.4(b) at p. 
153.) 
ters, struggling to maintain their position in 
a protracted debate in J the jury room, are 
led into the courtroor^ and, before their 
peers, specifically requested by the judge to 
reconsider their position. No similar re-
quest is made of the majority.12 It matters 
little that the judge (does not know the 
identity of the particular dissenters; their 
fellow jurors know, an<jl the danger immedi-
ately arises that "the Allen charge can com-
pound the inevitable pressure to agree felt 
by minority jurors." (People v. Smith 
(1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 401, 406, 113 Cal.Rptr. 
409, 413.) The charge " 'places the sanction 
of the court behind the views of the majori-
ty, whatever they may be, and tempts the 
minority juror to relinquish his position 
simply because he ha£ been the subject of a 
particular instruction.'" (U.S. v. Bailey, 
supra, 468 F.2d at p. 662, quoting from 
Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and 
the Hung Jury: A Reexamination of the 
Allen Charge (1967) 53 Va.L.Rev. 123, 129-
130.) As we noted in Carter, reversible 
error may be found in excessive pressure 
upon the jury "to r^ ach a verdict, whatever 
its nature, rather than no verdict at all." 
(68 Cal.2d at p. 817, 69 Cal.Rptr. at p. 302, 
442 P.2d at p. 358.)» 
[10] Neither is the overbearing charac-
ter of the charge altered by the judge's 
ignorance of whether the majority of the 
jury favors conviction or acquittal. The 
charge may distort the jury debate in a 
direction favorable or unfavorable to the 
defendant—but it distorts it nonetheless.14 
12. Since recognition of the existence of a ma-
jority or minority faction on the jury is irrele-
vant to the issue of guilt, such reference is 
erroneous, even if contained in an arguably 
noncoercive, "balanced" Allen charge which 
explicitly admonishes the majority as well as 
the minority to reconsider their views. 
13. The People contend that Carter "implicitly 
approved" the entire Allen charge. However, 
language endorsing the admonition to minority 
jurors to reconsider their views is conspicuous-
ly absent from the Carter opinion. 
14. Of course, when an Allen charge provokes a 
verdict of not guilty, the finality of that judg-
ment precludes review of the instruction on 
appeal. Since appellate courts hear only cases 
involving conviction, it is impossible to esti-
mate the percentage of cases in which an Allen 
instruction is followed by a verdict of acquittal. 
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Nor need we speculate that in the majority 
of cases the giving of an Allen instruction 
will aid the prosecution rather than the 
defense: an even distribution of risk be-
tween prosecution and defense over a mul-
titude of cases is not the measure of justice. 
Our jury system aspires to produce fair and 
accurate factual determinations in each 
case. An improper instruction should not 
be tolerated simply because statistically it 
may help defendants as much as prosecu-
tors. Whichever adversary it favors, in 
urging minority jurors to reconsider their 
votes the Allen charge places excessive and 
illegitimate pressures on the deliberating 
jury. For this reason the giving of the 
charge is error. 
"The Case Must at Some Time 
be Decided" 
The portion of the instruction beginning 
with the phrase, "You should consider that 
the case must at some time be decided," 
with its attendant implication that a mis-
trial will inevitably result in a retrial, 
presents a somewhat different problem 
from the admonition to minority jurors. 
While the latter language was included in 
the original instruction approved in Allen, 
the former, as previously noted, was a judi-
cial addition to the Allen text. On the 
other hand, dictum in People v. Carter 
(1968) supra, 68 Cal.2d 810, 815, 69 Cal.Rptr. 
297, 301, 442 P.2d 353, 357, does suggest the 
possibility of "reminding [the jury] that in 
the event of a mistrial the case will have to 
be retried." (See also People v. Miles (1904) 
143 Cal. 636, 639, 77 P. 666; cf People v. 
Burton (1961) 55 Cal.2d 328, 356, 11 Cal. 
Rptr. 65, 359 ?2d 433; People v. Crowley 
(1950) 101 Cal.App.2d 71, 74, 224 P.2d 748.) 
[11,12] The language regarding the ef-
fect of a mistrial is vulnerable to a differ-
15. In the context in which the charge is deliv-
ered, "decided" clearly refers to a dispositive 
determination of guilt by a trier of fact. Nor is 
the misleading implication of the sentence dis-
sipated when it is ambiguously phrased, as in 
an alternate version, "the case must at some 
time be disposed of." 
16. A third common feature of Allen -type in-
structions is a reference to the expense and 
inconvenience of a retrial. While such lan-
guage was absent from the charge in this case, 
it is equally irrelevant to the issue of defend-
ent, more esoteric objection: such state? 
ments are legally inaccurate. It is simply 
not true that a criminal case "must at some 
time be decided."15 The possibility of a 
hung jury is an inevitable by-product of our, 
unanimous verdict requirement. Confront-' 
ed with a mistrial, the People retain the1 
authority to request dismissal of the action. 
(Pen. Code, § 1385.) Moreover, this option 
is frequently exercised, as the criminal bar 
knows, when the prosecution concludes that 
its inability to obtain a conviction stemmed 
from deficiencies in its case. Thus the in-* 
conclusive judgment of a hung jury may 
well stand as the final word on the issue of 
a defendant's guilt. Because an instruction4, 
which implies that a hung jury will assured-^  
ly result in a retrial misstates the law, the 
court erred in giving that portion of the , , 
charge stating "the case must at some time* J 
be decided." (Cf. People v. Morse (1964) 60 
Cal.2d 631, 650, 36 Cal.Rptr. 201, 388 ?J2d 
33.) 
[13,14] To summarize our conclusions" 
thus far, both controversial features of the* 
Allen-type charge discussed herein inject 
extraneous and improper considerations" 
into the jury's debates. We therefore hold 
it is error for a trial court to give an 
instruction which either (1) encourages jur-
ors to consider the numerical division or 
preponderance of opinion on the jury in 
forming or reexamining their views on the 
issues before them; or (2) states or implies 
that if the jury fails to agree the case will 
necessarily be retried.11 We adopt the fore-
going as a judicially declared rule of crimi-
nal procedure. (Cf. People v. Rhodes (1974) 
12 Cal.3d 180, 185, 115 Cal.Rptr. 235, 524 
P.2d 363; People v. Vickers (1972) 8 Cal.3d 
451, 461, 105 Cal.Rptr. 305, 503 P.2d 1313f 
People v. Cahan (1955) 44 Cal.2d 434, 442, 
282 P.2d 905.)n Consequently we need not 
ant's guilt or innocence, and hence similarly 
impermissible. 
17. This conclusion also has the beneficial effect 
of removing a fertile source of criminal ap-
peals. Were the giving of an Allen -type 
charge potentially proper, the appellate courts 
of this state would be required to sift the facts 
and circumstances of each case in which the 
charge was delivered to determine whether the ^  
charge placed undue pressure on the jury to 
agree. (See, e.g.. People v. Baumganner (1958) 
supra, 166 Cal.App 2d 103, 107, 332 P 2d 366.) 
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reach defendant's contention that the read-
ing of the A/Zen-type charge violated his 
due process rights to a fair trial. 
Retroactivity 
[15,16] In determining the appropriate 
application of this holding, we begin with 
the three relevant considerations prescribed 
in previous cases: " '(a) the purpose to be 
served by the new standards, (b) the extent 
of the reliance by law enforcement authori-
ties on the old standards, and (c) the effect 
on the administration of justice of a retro-
active application of the new standards.'" 
(People v. Hitch (1974) 12 Cal.3d 641, 654, 
117 Cal.Rptr. 9, 18, 527 P.2d 361, 370 quot-
ing from Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 
293, 297, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199.)l8 
Undoubtedly our disapproval of Allen -type 
charges is not directed at the prophylactic 
prevention of police misconduct (see In re 
Lopez (1965) 62 Cal.2d 368, 377-379, 42 Cal. 
Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380; People v. Rollins 
(1967) 65 Cal.2d 681, 685-691, 56 Cal.Rptr. 
293, 423 P.2d 221; see also In re Harris 
(1961) 56 Cal.2d 879, 880, 16 CaLRptr. 889, 
366 P.2d 305 (cone. opn. of Traynor, J.)); 
rather it is aimed at judicial error which 
significantly infects the fact-finding process 
at trial. (See Stovall, supra, 388 U.S. at p. 
298, 87- S.Ct. 1967.) Given this critical pur-
pose, neither judicial reliance on previous 
appellate endorsements of the charge in 
this state nor any effects on the administra-
tion of justice require us to deny the bene-
fit of this rule to cases now pending on 
appeal. (Stovall, supra, at pp. 300-301, 87 
S.Ct. 1967; People v. Charles (1967) 66 
Cal.2d 330, 333-537, 57 Cal.Rptr. 745, 425 
P.2d 545, and cases there cited.) The latter 
consideration might be expected to weigh 
heavily against reliance on today's ruling 
for the purpose of reopening convictions 
now final. (See Lopez, supra, 62 Cal.2d at 
p. 381, 42 Cal.Rptr. 188, 398 P.2d 380; In re 
Gaines (1965) 63 Cal.2d 234, 240, 45 Cal. 
Eighteen years ago, consideration of the 
amount of judicial energy spent on such inquir-
ies prompted the Arizona Supreme Court to 
abandon the charge. (State v. Thomas (1959) 
86 Ariz. 161, 342 P.2d 197.) Other courts 
which have banned Allen have also done so in 
the name of appellate economy. (See United 
States v. Brown, supra, 411 F.2d 930; United 
States v. Fioravanti, supra, 412 F.2d 407; Unit-
ed States v. Thomas, supra, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 
101, 449 F.2d 1177.) 
Rptr! 865, 404 P.2d 473; Rollins, supra, Q5 
Cal.2d at p. 685, 56 Cal.Rptr. 293, 423 P.2d 
221.) However, because the record before 
us provides little basis for assessing the 
impact of such retroactive application, we 
do not determine whether or not our hold-
ing should be cognizable on collateral at-
tack. We decide only that the rule we here 
announce shall apply to the instant matter 
and to all cases not yet final as of the date 
of this decision. 
Prejudicial Effect 
[17] Because we hold it is error to read 
a charge containing either of the questiona-
ble elements discussed above, such instruc-
tions presumably will no longer be used in 
this state. However, in order to resolve 
appeals from convictions which come within 
the limited rule of retroactivity announced 
above—as well as to decide the present 
case—it will be necessary to determine the 
prejudicial effect of those errors. In con-
sidering this problem we distinguish the 
two erroneous aspects of the charge deliv-
ered by the judge below. 
As observed above, the ability of courts 
to gauge the precise effect on a jury of 
Allen -type instructions is limited, both by 
the traditional secrecy of jury deliberations 
and by the inherent difficulties of estimat-
ing the impact oi only one factor injected 
into the subjective processes of each juror. 
Many of these problems confront attempts 
to determine the effect of any error, but 
the difficulties are multiplied in the situa-
tion of the discriminatory admonition to 
dissenters delivered as a supplementary in-
struction to a divided jury. For example, 
when inadmissible evidence has been intro-
duced in a criminal trial, the court review-
ing a resulting conviction may conclude, 
after examining all the evidence, that the 
information erroneously admitted was "sur-
plus" or otherwise nonprejudicial. (See, e. 
g., People v. Cavanaugh (1955) 44 Cal.2d 
18. These factors have been applied to deter-
mine the appropriate scope of judicially de-
clared rules which are not necessarily constitu-
tionally required. (See, e.g., In re Yurko (1974) 
10 Cal.3d 857, ?65, 112 Cal.Rptr. 513, 519 P.2d 
561; HaJUday y\. United States (1969) 394 U.S. 
831, 832, 89 S.Ct. 1498. 23 L.Ed.2d 16.) 
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252, 268, 282 P.2d 53.) However, such evi-
dentiary review is less apposite when, prior 
to the infusion of error, the jury by hypoth-
esis themselves canvassed the evidence and 
arguments, and were unable to agree as to 
their import. (See Note, op. cit. supra, 47 
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 296, 308-309.) Moreover, the 
attack on dissenters does more than simply 
present another isolable factor for the 
jury's consideration—it distorts the very 
process by which all the evidence is 
weighed. An appellate court therefore may 
not assume that the verdict of the jury 
represents an untainted evaluation of what-
ever evidence was before them. 
' . The possibility of prejudicial effect, as 
well as the difficulty of discovering such 
effect, is magnified by the nature and tim-
ing of an admonition to minority jurors 
when it is used, as is typically the case, to 
undermine jury division. The instruction 
skews the deliberative process in a particu-
lar direction—toward the result favored by 
the majority. More significantly, this error 
is introduced at a crucial stage when the 
jury looks to the bench for advice on how to 
solve their dilemma. At that point, all the 
evidence and arguments already presented 
to the jury—even if they may later seem to 
a reviewing court to convincingly show the 
defendant's guilt—have failed to produce a 
verdict. Yet, with defendant's fate poised 
in the balance, the trial judge then tips the 
scales by use of an erroneous device. It is 
hard to conceive of circumstances in which 
error is more capable of producing prejudi-
cial consequences. 
; In sum, when the erroneous admonition 
to minority jurors is given or repeated to a 
criminal jury which have indicated that 
they are divided, it is difficult if not impos-
sible to ascertain if in fact prejudice oc-
curred; yet it is very likely that it did. We 
19. Similar considerations recently led the fed-
eral Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to 
declare a per se rule of reversal in cases in 
which a judge repeats an Allen charge "after a 
jury has reported itself deadlocked and has not 
itself requested a repetition of the instruction." 
(United States v. Seawell (1977) supra, 550 
. F.2d 1159, 1163.) The court conceded that 44A 
per se rule, such as the one we have adopted 
here, always poses the risk that it may sweep 
within its embrace cases which do not warrant 
its protection." (Fn. 8 at p. 1163.) However, 
after noting that defendants would otherwise 
conclude that a conviction following such a l 
charge given in those circumstances is a 
"miscarriage of justice" within the meaning* 
of article VI, section 13, of the California 1 
Constitution, and the judgment must be 
reversed. (See also Code Civ.Proc., § 475; | 
People v. Lyons (1956) 47 Cal.2d 311, 324, • 
303 P.2d 329.)19 The rule requires reversal 
in the instant case. -H 
£18] An erroneous instruction to the ef-
fect that "the case must at some time be 
decided" presents some, but not all, of the 
foregoing considerations. When the state-
ment is part of a supplementary charge to a JSpj 
divided jury, there is a significant danger 
that the verdict will be influenced by 
false belief that a mistrial will necessarily ' 
result in a retrial; on the other hand, the 
statement does not threaten to distort the 
process of jury decisionmaking to the same 
degree as the admonition to dissenters. Ac- [ 
cordingly, a per se rule of reversal is not 
required when only this erroneous stated 
ment is included in otherwise correct in-
structions, even if given to a deadlocked 
jury. In such cases a miscarriage of justice 
will be avoided if the reviewing court 
makes a further examination of all the cir-
cumstances under which the charge was 
given to determine whether it was reason-
ably probable that a result more favorable 
to the defendant would have been reached 
in the absence of the error. (See People v. 
Watson (1956) 46 CaL2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 
243.) In so doing, however, the court 
should recognize that the more the errone-
ous statement appears to have been a sig-
nificant influence exerted on a jury after a
 t 
division of juror opinion had crystallized, 
the less relevant is the court's own percep-
tion of the weight of the evidence presented 
to the jury before the impasse.20 k.^\ ; 
"face insurmountable difficulties in attempting 
to show prejudice," the majority concluded 
that the " 'cost' of adopting a per se rule is 
outweighed by the importance of defendant's 
right to an impartial jury trial and the insur-; 
mountable problems of proof and appellate re- . 
view that a less definite rule would occasion. 
(Ibid.)
 ;::v: 
20. For example, when the statement is the cen-
tral feature of instructions given to a dead-
locked jury, it is more likely to have tainted 
their subsequent verdict than when the panel 
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Appropriate Instructions 
For the guidance of the trial bench, we 
note that none of the errors enumerated 
herein is contained in CAUIC No. 17.40 (3d 
ed. 1970), and we commend its continued 
use. The sample instruction endorsed by 
the American Bar Association also elimi-
nates the objectionable aspects of the 
charge given in this case, and advises the 
jury of their proper role in a manner which 
may assist them in their deliberations.21 
Summary 
The Allen charge, to the extent it still 
survives, has been preserved because it is 
deemed to be an effective device for pro-
ducing verdicts from otherwise deadlocked 
juries. However, it achieves such efficacy 
as it may have through a subtle mixture of 
inaccuracy and impropriety, in a manner 
which can dramatically distort the fact-
finding function of the jury in a criminal 
case.22 Ultimately, even the saving of judi-
cial resources, which has been the main 
justification for its continued existence, is 
outweighed by the burden the charge im-
poses on the appellate courts. To borrow 
the words uttered for a defendant who has 
long since lost his appeal, in criminal trials 
an Allen-type instruction "should never 
again be read in a California courtroom." 
(People v. Smith, supra, 38 Cal.App.3d 401, 
406, 113 Cal.Rptr. 409, 413.) 
Remaining Issues 
Two further issues are raised by defend-
ant on this appeal. First, he argues it was 
has evinced no division and the statement 
merely accompanies a requested rereading of 
portions of the testimony or previous instruc-
tions. In the former case, the standard of re-
versible error presumably would be met, as 
there would be little to indicate that the height-
ened potential for prejudice had not been real-
ized. 
21. The instruction reads in relevant part: 
'The verdict must represent the considered 
judgment of each juror. In order to return a 
verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree 
thereto. Your verdict must be unanimous. 
"It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with 
one another and to deliberate with a view to 
reaching an agreement, if you can do so with-
out violence to individual judgment. Each of 
you must decide the case for yourself, but do so 
only after an impartial consideration of the 
evidence with your fellow jurors. In the course 
of your deliberations, do not hesitate to reex-
amine your own views and change your opin-
566 P2d—22 
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error for the trial court to admit into evi-
dence a revolver found at his apartment. 
Second, he contends he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel whep the attorney 
with whom he consulted ^fter his arrest 
allowed the police to procijre the weapon. 
Because the validity of any retrial of this 
case may depend on the correct resolution 
of these issues and they are properly before 
us, we decide them here. (Code Civ.Proc., 
§43.) 
[19] Defendant contends the gun was 
the "fruit" of an interrogation conducted in 
, violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 
U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, and 
was therefore inadmissible. (Wong Sun v. 
United States (1963) 371 ^J.S. 471, 486, 83 
S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441; People v. Superior 
Court (Keithley) (1975) 13 Cal.3d 406, 410, 
118 Cal.Rptr. 617, 530 P.2d 585.) The inter-
view in question occurred immediately after 
defendant presented himself at the police 
station on the day of the crime. A tape of 
the conversation revealed that he declined 
to waive his right to regain silent and 
expressed a desire not to talk with police 
officers at that time. The trial judge par-
tially granted defendants motion to sup-
press statements made after the interrogat-
ing officer, Detective Kannisto, prolonged 
the interview, and the People do not contest 
this ruling. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 
pp. 473-474, 86 S.Ct. 1602; Keithley, supra, 
13 Cal.3d at p. 410, 118 Cal.Rptr. 617, 530 
P.2d 585.)a After the initial interrogation, 
ion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not 
surrender your honest conviction as to the 
weight or effect of evidence solely because of 
the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the 
mere purpose of returning a verdict.'* (ABA 
Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal 
Justice, Stds. Relating to Trial by Jury (Ap-
proved Draft 1968) supra, commentary to std. 
5.4(a), at p. 146, quoting ffom Mathes, op. cit. 
supra, 27 F.R.D. 39, 97-98.) 
This instruction, like CAUIC No. 17.40, may 
be included in the initial instructions given to 
the jury before they begin deliberations, or, 
where appropriate, delivered as a supplemental 
charge. 
22. Since the use of A/ien-type instructions in 
civil cases may be subject to different consider-
ations, we do not decide whether such use is 
also error. 
23. The trial court did admit two statements 
made by defendant after he had refused to 
discuss the case. These were answers that 
~ < 1 ' 
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defendant was permitted to meet with his 
parents in private. Upon emerging from 
the meeting, he agreed to show Kannisto 
the location of his revolver. Defendant also 
met briefly with an attorney, who, accord-
ing to Kannisto, then told the police that it 
was "okay to search for the gun." The 
police drove defendant to his apartment, 
where he pointed out the gun in a cabinet. 
Defendant relies on our decision in Keith-
ley. There the defendant made a highly 
incriminating admission during an unlawful 
interrogation, and we reasoned that his sub-
sequent consent to a search "may well have 
been influenced by knowledge he had al-
ready admitted involvement in the crime." 
(Id. at p. 411, 118 Cal.Rptr. at p. 619, 530 
?M at p. 587.) In this case, however, the 
unlawfully obtained statements were am-
biguous, if not completely benign.24 More-
over, in Keithley the police told the defend-
ant, during the unlawful interview, that 
they intended to obtain a search warrant— 
after which the defendant promptly agreed 
to the search. Although Kannisto contin-
ued subtly urging defendant to discuss the 
case after the latter had refused a Miranda 
waiver, the consent to search came only 
after an intervening discussion between de-
fendant and his parents. Thus, the record 
presents no basis for holding that defend-
ant's consent was the result of exploitation 
of the earlier interrogation so as to require 
application of the constitutional exclusion-
ary policies of Wong Sun and Keithley. 
[20,21] We further reject defendant's 
claim that he was denied effective assist-
defendant interjected in response to questions 
directed by Kannisto to his partner, Sergeant 
Fusselman. Kannisto testified as follows: "1 
asked my partner, 'What type of gun was that, 
do you know?' 
"Q. [by deputy district attorney]. And, 
what if anything did he reply? 
"A. My partner didn't say anything. The 
Defendant, who was seated to my right, replied 
Thirty-Eight Special.' 
**Q. Did you make any further inquiries 
then? 
"A. 1 then replied, 'Smith & Wesson?' 
"The Defendant then replied, 'Thirty-Eight 
Special, registered to me,' I believe. 
"Q. Do you recall—referring to your notes, 
if necessary—whether the specific type of gun 
was mentioned by the Defendant? 
"A. I believe he said, 'Charter Arms, regis-
tered to me.'" 
ance of counsel in violation of his Sixth 
Amendment rights. It is defendant's bur-
den to show counsel's incompetence. (Pech 
pie v. Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 613,' 
114 Cal.Rptr. 250, 522 P.2d 1058; People v. 
Jenkins (1975) 13 Cal.3d 749, 753, 119 CaL 
Rptr. 705, 532 P.2d 857.) "The proof of this 
inadequacy or ineffectiveness must be a 
demonstrable reality and not a speculative 
matter." (People v. Stephenson (1974) 10 
Cal.3d 652, 661, 111 Cal.Rptr. 556, 562, 517 
P.2d 820, 826.) Here, all the evidence dis. '; '^^" 
closes is that defendant's attorney consent-*^^; 
ed to the police search for the gun—and ; ^ | i : 
presumably advised defendant to so con-^j|&< 
sent—after meeting for approximately 10 
minutes with his client. These bare facts 
do not support a conclusion that counsel's 
advice was incompetent. (Cf. Stanworth,^-
supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 608,114 Cal.Rptr. 250, * 
522 P.2d 1058.) The revolver was regis-^ 
tered to defendant, and his attorney may 
well have recognized that the police could 
obtain a warrant to search for it if necesv 
sary. 
The judgment is reversed. 
TOBRINER, Acting C. J., and RICH-1 
ARDSON, J., WRIGHT, C. J. (Retired Chief J 
Justice of the Supreme Court sitting undernjf 
assignment by the Acting Chairman of the 
Judicial Council), SULLIVAN (Retired As--: 
sociate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting 
under assignment by the Chairman of the v| 
Judicial Council), and TAYLOR (Assigned . 
by the Chairman of the Judicial Council),-
JJ., concur. 
Kannisto admitted thai his partner may have^  
had in his possession a copy of the registration^ 
card for defendant's gun, and that defendant, 
could have been referring to the weapon noted^ 
on the card rather than the gun used in the^  
slaying. 
Defendant did not testify that he thought the j 
questions were directed to him, and he does not.; 
attack on appeal the admission of his response 
es . "•+** 
24. The only potentially significant statemefltsj 
suppressed at trial were defendant's vague *r*y 
marks that "I never . . . disliked the ffl**2 
or anything" and "I don't even remember i 
brought it on." Nor can defendant's consent^  
reasonably be termed a reaction to his havfaf i 
interjected answers to Kannisto's queries'Oy 
Sergeant Fusselman. (See fn. 23, ante.) &*pl 
were we to consider, in this context, an attackj 
on the admissibility of those admissions, i 
prejudicial effect is questionable. 
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CLARK, Justice, dissenting. 
"Once a cause has been submitted to the 
jury, and absent a discharge by consent, the 
court bears the statutory responsibility of 
assuring that a verdict is rendered 'unless, 
at the expiration of such time as the court 
may deem proper, it satisfactorily appears 
that there is no reasonable probability that 
the jury can agree.' (Pen. Code, § 1140.) 
[H] The discharge of this responsibility nec-
essarily requires that the court, in cases 
where the jury has been unable to reach 
agreement, make the indicated determina-
tion of 'reasonable probability' and, in cases 
where in accordance with sound legal dis-
cretion [citations omitted] it is determined 
that such a probability exists, that it take 
appropriate action to encourage agree-
ment." (People v. Carter (1968) 68 Cal.2d 
810, 815, 69 Cal.Rptr. 297, 300, 442 P.2d 353, 
356.) 
The "Allen instruction" is an "appropri-
ate action to encourage agreement." But 
the majority opinion attacks two aspects of 
the instruction. 
First, the majority find fault with the 
clause "the case must at some time be de-
cided." However, this court understand-
ably approved that statement in People v. 
Carter, supra, 68 Cal.2d 810, 69 Cal.Rptr. 
297, 442 P.2d 353. "[I]f the court deter-
mines that a reasonable probability of 
agreement does exist, it may, generally 
speaking, undertake certain measures calcu-
lated to encourage agreement. These in-
clude impressing the jury with the solemni-
ty and importance of its task and reminding 
it that in the event of a mistrial the case 
will have to be retried, with attendant ex-
penditure of money and time, and decided 
upon similar if not identical evidence by a 
jury of persons having qualifications equal 
to those of the present jury." (Id. at pp. 
815-816, 69 Cal.Rptr. at p. 301, 442 P.2d at 
p. 357.) 
Next, the majority attack the Allen in-
struction as introducing an "extraneous fac-
tor" into the jury's deliberations, "de-
flecting them] from their proper role as 
triers of fact," insofar as it states that "a 
dissenting juror should consider whether a 
doubt in his or her own mind is a reasonable 
one, which makes no impression on the 
minds of so many men or women equally 
honest, equally intelligent with himself or 
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herself." But the attack fails. To suggest 
that someone reexamine his view because 
the majority of those called upon to decide 
a question have readied another conclusion 
hardly introduces an '^irrational" or "irrele-
vant" consideration. And it is certainly not 
akin to instructing him to decide the ques-
tion from his "prejudices or desire to go 
home." For example, it is common for one 
judge of this court to invite another to 
reexamine his position upon a showing that 
a majority of jurisdictions considering an 
issue have taken the opposite position. In-
deed, in this very case the majority opinion, 
manifesting uneasiness in adopting the 
view held by only a minority of jurisdictions 
on the Allen question, cites the decisions of 
three federal circuits and "at least 22 
states" as evidence that its position repre-
sents the "modern trend." The appeal to 
be "modern" is, of course, a separate consid-
eration, one more appropriate to the fashion 
industry than to the law. On the other 
hand, the fact that a significant number of 
jurisdictions disapprove of a practice is a 
valid reason for reconsidering it. But, as 
the Allen instruction emphasizes, one's deci-
sion must ultimately be one's own. 
Having reconsidered the Allen instruction 
because a majority of my colleagues appear 
to disapprove of it, I t^ill agree with Chief 
Justice (then Circuit Judge) Burger that 
"the Allen charge is a carefully balanced 
method of reminding jurors of their ele-
mentary obligations, which they can lose 
sight of during protracted deliberations. It 
is perfectly valid to remind them that they 
should give some thought to the views of 
others and should reconsider their position 
in light of those views. The charge as 
given here did not require the jury to reach 
a verdict but only reminded them of their 
duty to attempt an accommodation. While 
it suggests to the minority that they recon-
sider their position in light of a majority 
having a different view, it reminds them 
that they should not acquiesce in a verdict 
which does not represent their own convic-
tions." (Fulwood v. United States (1966) 
125 U.S.App.D.C. 183, 369 F.2d 960, 962, 
cert. den. 387 U.S. 934, 87 S.Ct. 2058, 18 
L.Ed.2d 996.) 
The judgment should be affirmed. 
Rehearing denied; CLARK and RICH-
ARDSON, JJ., dissenting 
ADDENDUM E 
INSTRUCTION NO. ' f 
The State of Utah and the defendant both are entitled 
to the individual opinion of each jurotf. It is the duty of 
each of you after considering all the Evidence in the case, to 
determine, if possible, the question oif guilt or innocence of 
the defendant. When you have reached 4 conclusion in that re-
spect, you should not change it merely because one or more or 
all of your fellow jurors may have come to a different con-
clusion. However, each juror should freely and fairly discuss 
with his fellow jurors the evidence an4 the deduction to be 
drawn therefrom. If, after doing so, 4nY juror should be sat-
isfied that a conclusion first reached by him was wrong, he 
unhesitatingly should abandon that original opinion and render 
his verdict according to his final decision. 
